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Abstract
This dissertation studies the effects of government policies on macroeconomic aggregates. Chapter
1 evaluates the impact of occupational licensing on consumer welfare, the allocation of labor, and
the wage premium between licensed and unlicensed workers. In the United States, workers must
undergo training and pay a fee to become licensed. Licensing policy protects consumers by allevi-
ating an information asymmetry in the product market. However, it is an entry barrier that distorts
the occupational choice of workers in the labor market. To analyze this trade-off, a framework with
adverse selection in the product market and occupational choice in the labor market is developed.
The model is calibrated to the US labor market using worker level micro-data. Removing licensing
training requirements leads to a 4 percent reduction in consumer welfare and the wage premium falls
by more than half.
Chapter 2 is written jointly with Marcos Dinerstein. This chapter studies the effect of corporate
taxes on aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). Using Chilean manufacturing data, this chapter
documents that there is large dispersion in the effective tax rate and there is a large mass of firms
facing a 0 percent tax rate. These features are used to develop and discipline a standard monopolistic
competition model with corporate tax rates. When corporate taxes are eliminated, TFP increases
between 4 and 11 percent. However, when all firms face the Chilean statutory tax rate, TFPdecreases
despite the fact that the dispersion in tax rates is eliminated.
Chapter 3 is coauthored with Guillermo Cabral. This chapter analyzes the role of demograph-
ics in explaining the trends of real variables after the Great Recession. An important reason why
demographics play an important role during the crisis’s recovery period is that the Great Recession
coincides with the “baby boomers” entering retirement age. This chapter documents that employ-
ment is converging to a different trend relative to its pre-crisis long term trend. A standard growth
model with demographic features is calibrated in order to quantify the effect of demographics on out-
put after the Great Recession. Demographics account for 35% of the change in the trend of output
after 2008.
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1 The Welfare and Labor Market Effects of Occupational Li-
censing
1.1 Introduction
Occupational licensing and its impact on the United States economy is at the heart of the current
policy agenda. Close to 25 percent of workers in the United States are required to have an occu-
pational license in order to perform their job. Furthermore, as highlighted by Carpenter, Knepper,
Erickson, and Ross (2012) and Kleiner and Krueger (2013), the share of licensed workers in the US
labor market has increased fivefold since the 1950s. Understanding the social benefits and costs of
occupational licensing are topics of much debate as this policy has implications for consumer welfare
and for labor market outcomes.
Licensing policy generates a trade-off. On the one hand, licensing can have a positive effect on
consumer welfare by alleviating an information asymmetry in the markets of goods and services. In
particular, when consumers purchase goods from producers, consumers are less informed than the
producers about the quality of the product. On the other hand, licensing policy acts as a barrier to
entry that prevents individuals from working in licensed occupations. Workers that wish to enter
licensed professions are typically required to pay a licensing fee and undergo occupation specific
training. Hence, licensing lowers incentives for workers to enter licensed occupations as it is costly
in terms of resources, time, and effort.
This chapter studies the effect of occupational licensing on welfare, the allocation of labor, and
the wage premium between licensed and unlicensed workers. My first contribution is to develop a
framework with the key ingredients that highlight the trade-off generated by licensing policy. Earlier
literature pioneered by Leland (1979) and Shapiro (1986) carried out theoretical analyses of the effect
of licensing policy on consumer welfare. They determine that licensing can be welfare improving
in the presence of information asymmetries in the product market, since buyers know less about
the quality of goods relative to sellers. I build on this earlier theoretical literature by developing a
framework with adverse selection in the product market, occupational choice in the labor market,
and a licensing policy composed of a fee and training. In the model, changes in the licensing policy
affect consumer welfare through two forces. As licensing requirements are higher, the quality of
the goods that are produced increases, which raises welfare. However, less resources are allocated
towards consumption and more towards license costs, which reduces welfare.
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My second contribution is to quantify the welfare and labor market effects of reforming occu-
pational licensing in the US. For this, I estimate the parameters of the theoretical model to match
moments of the US labor market, focusing only on occupations that are predominantly composed of
workers with less than college education. The conventional view of the literature on the effects of
occupational licensing policy on consumer welfare is that the social costs are larger than the benefits.
However, the literature’s assessment of these benefits has been limited. I provide the first estimates
of the welfare consequences of occupational licensing within a theoretical framework that explicitly
models a market failure: adverse selection in the product market. I find that removing the train-
ing requirements of licensing results in a reduction of 3.9 percent in consumer welfare. Although
consumption rises as lower resources are allocated towards license cots, lower quality goods are pro-
duced resulting in the consumer welfare loss. Hence, I find that the quality effect dominates when
training requirements are removed.
In addition, this chapter contributes to the vast literature on wage differences between licensed
and unlicensed workers. Using the calibrated model, I decompose the wage premium between li-
censed and unlicensed workers into components explained by the composition of ability of workers
between occupations, occupation-specific skills obtained from licensing training requirements, and
information rents. I find that under different licensing training requirements, changes in the wage
premium are explained mainly by changes in the composition of workers between licensed and un-
licensed occupations.
To determine the effects of occupational licensing on consumer welfare and labor market out-
comes, I set up a static model in which the economy has two productive sectors. In one of the sectors,
the good produced is heterogeneous in its quality, an attribute that is unobserved by consumers. In the
other sector, a homogeneous good is produced. Workers choose between producing in either sector
based on their ability. Licensing policy is modeled as an entry barrier workers face when entering the
sector with the information asymmetry, which I refer to as the licensed sector. Specifically, workers
must incur in an entry fee as well as training. Training is costly in terms of time, the opportunity cost
of licensing, and in terms of the effort, the effort training cost of licensing. The effort training cost
is increasing in the amount of training content and decreasing in the ability of workers. Intuitively,
workers must exert more effort the greater the training content. Also, given a level of training con-
tent, workers of higher ability have to exert less effort in relation to their lower ability counterparts.
The training requirements of licensing provide sector-specific skills that augment workers’ produc-
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tivity in that sector. Workers in the licensed sector produce goods with a quality that is determined
by their ability and also by sector-specific skills obtained from training. Consumers obtain utility
from consuming quantities of the goods from both sectors and from the quality of the licensed sector
good.
In an economywithout licensing the standard result of Akerlof (1970) holds: lower quality goods
are produced in the sector with the information asymmetry. The reason for this is that the informa-
tion asymmetry in the product market affects the allocation of workers in the labor market. In the
licensed sector, worker’s earnings are the same regardless of their ability. This is because the price
of licensed goods is the same, as shoppers cannot differentiate the qualities of these goods. As a
result, in the licensed sector, high ability workers are undercompensated and low ability workers
are overcompensated for their ability. On the contrary, in the unlicensed sector, workers are always
fully compensated for their ability as there are no information asymmetries in that sector. Under
no licensing requirements, high ability workers enter the unlicensed sector and low ability workers
enter the licensed sector.
The training component of licensing plays an important role in alleviating the negative effects of
the information asymmetry on the quality of the licensed good. When a licensing policy with train-
ing is introduced into the economy, it affects the quality of licensed goods through two channels: the
sorting channel and the sector-specific skills channel. Licensing policy determines the composition
of ability of workers between the licensed and unlicensed sectors, which I refer to as the sorting chan-
nel. As training requirements increase, workers of lower ability select out of licensed occupations,
since it is more costly for them to carry out the training. Given this, quantity falls which increases
the price of licensed goods. As a result, higher ability workers find it more profitable to enter the
licensed sector, improving the overall quality of licensed goods. The sector-specific skills channel
impacts quality directly as workers’ quality production is augmented by the skills workers obtain
through training. Thus, higher training requirements increase the quality of licensed goods, which
raises consumer welfare and increases the wage premium. However, as license costs increase, house-
holds must spend more resources on these costs, resulting in lower quantities of both goods being
consumed. Hence, higher training requirements reduce the quantities of goods traded, which lowers
the welfare of households. In summary, although increasing training requirements of licensing may
alleviate the adverse selection problem by improving the quality of licensed goods, it generates a
higher deadweight loss through less resources being spent on quantity consumption.
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I use the 2008 SIPP panel and the O*NET database to estimate the model. More specifically, I
analyze occupations that are similar in the education level of their workers, by focusing on occupa-
tions that are predominantly made up of workers with less than college education. I refer to these
occupations as low-skilled occupations. In this manner, I am controlling for differences in education
that may have a clear impact on occupational choice. For workers in these occupations, I document
that only 15 percent of them are licensed and, on average, the wages of licensed workers is 16 percent
higher. Next, I decompose this wage premium and find that 9 percentage points are accounted for
by skill observables in the data, which I refer to as the skill component.
I estimate the model to moments from my sample of workers in low-skilled occupations. Using
the estimatedmodel, I determine howmuch of the skill component is explained by the sorting channel
and how much is explained by the sector-specific skills channel. I find that skills obtained from
training play an important role in explaining the 9 percentage point skill component. I also use the
estimated model to carry out counterfactual policy analysis. In particular, I compare the current
US economy, which I refer to as the benchmark, to alternative economies with different licensing
policies. The main counterfactual policy analysis I carry out is to eliminate the training requirements
of licensing, while keeping the homogeneous fee constant. I find that under this counterfactual,
consumer welfare falls in 3.9 percent and the wage premium falls by more than half. Although
consumer welfare improves as more quantities are traded in equilibrium, this is offset by a reduction
in the quality of licensed goods. The fall in the quality is driven mainly by the sorting channel. With
respect to the wage premium, the drastic fall is driven by a fall in the skill component. Furthermore,
the decrease in the skill component is explained in 78 percent by the sorting channel and in 22 percent
by the removal of sector-specific skills. I also consider counterfactual licensing policies in which
the training requirements vary. I find that an optimal licensing training policy, leads to an increment
in consumer welfare of 2.6 percent. Last, I evaluate the case in which training requirements are kept
the same as in the benchmark economy and the fee component of licensing is eliminated. Under this
counterfactual scenario, welfare only improves in 0.1 percent.
1.2 Related Literature
This chapter contributes to the growing literature on occupational licensing and its effects on the
product and labor markets. The traditional argument in favor of a licensing policy is that there exists
an information asymmetry between consumers and producers in the markets of goods and services.
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In this manner, a licensing policy can improve welfare of consumers if it can raise the quality of
goods produced. Leland (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1981a,b, 1982a,b), and Shapiro (1983, 1986)
develop models to qualitatively analyze product markets associated with information asymmetries
in the quality of goods. Moreover, this earlier literature evaluates the welfare and earnings implica-
tions of regulating the producers of these goods. In particular, Shapiro (1986) proposes a model with
moral hazard, in which professionals underinvest in the quality of goods they produce. By raising
investment requirements, licensing alleviates the information asymmetry and raises the quality of
products. Leland (1979) sets up a model, in the spirit of Akerlof (1970), in which there is adverse
selection in the product market as quality of goods cannot be observed. Under this market structure,
he evaluates the welfare implications of introducing a minimum quality standard for products. Fur-
thermore, Leland (1979) points out that licensing standards chosen by a professional group can lead
to other inefficiencies, such as market power of the licensing group.
The theoretical framework I develop in this chapter most closely relates to Leland (1979), as the
information asymmetry is adverse selection. The main difference between the previous theoretical
work and my framework, is that licensing policy not only has implications for the quality of goods
that are produced, but also affects the occupational choice of workers. Shaked and Sutton (1981a,b)
evaluate the coexistence of competing professions, but in their analysis workers do not endogenously
choose to enter the different professions. In my theoretical framework, workers choose to allocate
into different occupations based on ability, the licensing policy, and the effects of the information
asymmetry that carries over from the product market to the labor market.
More recent work has tried to determine the quantitative implications of licensing for welfare.
An extensive list of articles have analyzed the effects of licensing on the quality of goods produced.
The main argument is that if licensing policy raises the quality of goods, then consumer welfare in-
creases. These papers have mainly focused on analyzing the licensing effects on quality for specific
occupations and conclusions vary according to each case study.1 For example, Kleiner and Kudrle
(2000) and Wiswall (2007) find that stricter licensing requirements do not improve the quality of
dentists and teachers, respectively. On the other hand, Adams III et al. (2003) and Anderson et al.
(2016) find opposite results on the quality of services of midwives. Kleiner and Soltas (2018) de-
velop a richer theoretical framework to explain the welfare effects of occupational licensing, without
1Papers that have analyzed the effects of licensing on quality are Adams III et al. (2002), Adams III et al. (2003), Anderson
et al. (2016), Barrios (2018), Carroll and Gaston (1981), Kleiner and Kudrle (2000), Kleiner and Petree (1988), Kugler and
Sauer (2005), Larsen (2013), Wiswall (2007), among others.
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modeling a market failure. In particular, they argue that the quantity of labor hours is a sufficient
statistic for welfare analysis and find that the welfare costs of licensing offset its benefits.
A caveat of the work highlighted above is that the theoretical framework used for quantitative
analysis abstracts from modeling any market failure which can be corrected by occupational licens-
ing. I contribute to this literature by explicitly modeling an information asymmetry in the product
market. Incorporating an information problem into the theoretical model is key in exemplifying the
role of licensing in the economy and the trade-off it generates. More specifically, the interaction
between the information problem and the licensing policy has a direct impact on the quality of goods
produced in the licensed sector as well as the allocation of workers between licensed and unlicensed
occupations. To my knowledge, I am the first to quantitatively evaluate this trade-off.
Finally, I contribute to the extensive empirical analysis of the effects of licensing on labor market
outcomes. The main consensus is that licensing acts as a barrier to entry that restricts the quantity
of goods sold in licensed occupations, as highlighted by Blair and Chung (2018a), Friedman (1962),
Gittleman et al. (2017), Kleiner (2000), Kleiner and Krueger (2013), Kleiner and Soltas (2018),
Thornton and Timmons (2013), among others. Another related topic that has been vastly studied is
the wage differential between licensed and unlicensed workers. Work by Blair and Chung (2018b),
Kleiner and Krueger (2013, 2010), Kleiner and Soltas (2018), Thornton and Timmons (2013), among
others, have estimated a wage premium of licensed workers between 6 and 15 percent, for different
data sets. Most studies find that controlling for observables of skills explain some of the wage
premium but not all. The remaining difference has been attributed to rents generated by quantity
restrictions, Kleiner and Krueger (2013), or by information asymmetries, Blair and Chung (2018b).
By modeling an endogenous occupational choice, I contribute to the literature by providing a
selection mechanism of workers into occupations, which depends on the physical environment, the
worker’s ability, and the licensing policy. Hence, I am able to analyze the effect of licensing on the
quantity supply of labor and on the quality (ability) supply of labor into licensed occupations. I also
complement the wage premium analysis of the literature by decomposing it into components that are
attributed to differences in workers’ ability between sectors, training requirements of licensing, and
information rents.
6
1.3 Theoretical Framework
This section provides a description of the theoretical framework. First I describe the physical envi-
ronment of the model in absence of licensing. I characterize the equilibrium for this case. Then, I
extend the model to include licensing policy and characterize the equilibrium for this case.
1.3.1 Environment
I consider a static model with adverse selection in the goods market and occupational choice in the
labor market. The economy is populated by a continuum measure 1 of identical households. Each
household is composed of one shopper and a continuum of measure 1 of workers. There are two
productive sectors, j = 1, 2, in the economy. Workers are heterogeneous in their ability, a. Given
their ability, workers choose to produce between the two sectors. Within each sector, a worker is self-
employed and uses his ability and equipment,m, to produce. Households own all the equipment in
the economy and supply it inelastically. In sector 1, the goods produced are differentiated in their
quality. Aworker in this sector produces goods of a specific quality which depends on his ability. In
sector 2, workers produce a homogeneous good. The good produced in sector j will be referred to
as good j. The shopper cannot observe the specific quality, x1, produced by a worker in sector 1.
He randomly chooses a worker and buys quantity c1 from that self-employed worker. In sector 2,
the good’s quality is homogeneous and the shopper purchases quantity c2 in the market. Households
have preferences over the quantities of goods produced in each sector and over the quality of good
1.
1.3.2 Workers and Production
Workers are heterogeneous in their ability a ∈ [a, a¯], which is distributed according to µ (a). A
production unit is made up of a single worker with ability a, who acts as an entrepreneur. This
worker uses his ability and rents equipment,m, in order to produce. In sector 1, a worker of ability
a produces a quantity of goods with technology:
f1 (m) = mθ, (1)
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where θ is the output elasticity of equipment. The goods produced byworker of ability a have quality:
x1 (a) = a. (2)
In sector 2, a worker uses his ability and equipment for quantity production
f2 (a,m) = amθ. (3)
1.3.3 Occupational Choice
Aworker of ability a, must choose between producing in sector 1 or sector 2. In sector 1, a worker
obtains earnings w1 (a):
w1 (a) = max
m
p1f1 (m)− rm, (4)
where r is the price of equipment. It is important to note that since quality is not observed for the
sector 1 good, then there exists only one price for that good, p1. Hence, workers in sector 1 are not
compensated for the specific quality that they produce with technology (2). This quality is produced
at no cost. In sector 2, a worker obtains earnings w2 (a):
w2 (a) = max
m
f2 (a,m)− rm. (5)
The sector 2 good is the numeraire good of the economy. I denotemj (a) as the amount of equipment
demanded by the production unit with worker of ability a in sector j. Given the quantity production
technologies (1) and (3), the share of output of a production unit that corresponds to a worker is 1−θ.
Last, a worker’s occupational choice is given by:
w (a) = max
d∈{1,0}
d [w1 (a)] + [1− d]w2 (a) . (6)
1.3.4 Household Problem
Good 1 is differentiated in its quality level x1 (a), which depends on the ability, a, of the worker
that produces it. Ex ante, the household’s shopper cannot differentiate the specific quality produced
by a worker in sector 1. Due to the information problem, shoppers have beliefs σ (a) about the
distribution of qualities of good 1, i.e. the different abilities of workers in sector 1. Given his beliefs,
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the shopper chooses to buy a quantity c1 of good 1 and randomly chooses a worker to buy it from.
Good 2 is homogeneous and the shopper buys quantity c2 of this good in a competitive market. Ex
post, the household obtains utility U (c1, x1 (a) , c2) from consuming both goods of the economy.2
The sources of income of the household are the earnings of its workers, w (a), and the income from
renting equipment.
The household’s problem is given by:
max
c1,c2
Eσ [U (c1, x1 (a) , c2)] (7)
s.t.
p1c1 + c2 =
∫ a¯
a
w (a) ∂µ (a) + r
∫ a¯
a
[d (a)m1 (a) + [1− d (a)]m2 (a)] ∂µ (a) .
Households choose {c1, c2} to maximize their utility. By assumption, there is perfect consumption
insurance within each household. This is because all workers pay out their earnings to be shared
equally in the household. The combination of this with the law of large numbers across households,
allows for the construction of a representative household.
1.3.5 Characterization of Equilibrium
Since households are identical, they all demand the same quantities of each good. Given that the
measures of households and workers are 1, any household’s consumption of cj is equal to aggregate
consumption of good j. Likewise, the demand of equipment for a worker of ability a is equal to the
aggregate demand of equipment for all workers with that ability. I denote uppercase letters as aggre-
gate quantities. The competitive equilibrium is defined as follows. Given the ability distribution
µ (a), a competitive equilibrium consists of relative price p1, workers’ occupational choice d (a) and
equipment choicemj (a), households’ consumption choices {c1, c2} and beliefs σ (a) such that:
1. Given σ (a) and p1, {c1, c2} solve the households’ problems.
2. Given p1, d (a) andmj (a) solve the workers’ problems.
2A result of Akerlof (1970) is that in certain cases, markets can completely shut down when there exists adverse selection.
The intuition of why this happens is as follows. The price, p1, determines the quality of goods produced in sector 1. In
particular, higher ability workers may not be willing to produce in sector 1, given that they may be underpaid in terms of
their ability given a value of p1. Without any assumptions on the demand of good 1, it can be the case that all workers are
underpaid in sector 1 and decide to produce in sector 2. To avoid this issue, I assume that households always consume positive
quantities of both goods:
lim
cj→0
∂U (c1, x1 (a) , c2)
∂cj
=∞.
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3. Markets clear:
C1 =
∫ a¯
a
m1 (a)θ I{d(a)=1}dµ (a) ,
C2 =
∫ a¯
a
am2 (a)θ I{d(a)=0}dµ (a) .
4. Beliefs are consistent:
Eσ [x1 (a)] =
∫ a¯
a
am1 (a)θ I{d(a)=1}dµ (a)∫ a¯
a
m1 (a)θ I{d(a)=1}dµ (a)
.
The consistency condition on beliefs has the following interpretation. In equilibrium, the expected
value of quality for households given their beliefs is equal to the average quality of good 1 that is
produced. As can be seen from the right hand side of the consistency condition, the average quality
in sector 1 is equivalent to the total quality-adjusted output divided by the total output in that sector.
Due to the information structure, the competitive equilibrium defined above is characterized by
having workers of low ability in sector 1 and workers of high ability in sector 2. There exists a cut-
off ability, a˜ ∈ [a, a¯], such that workers with a ≤ a˜ enter sector 1 and workers with a > a˜ enter sector
2. See section A.1 in the Appendix. The proposition above highlights important implications of
the adverse selection problem on the goods and the labor markets. The households’ demands for
both goods as well as the equilibrium conditions determine cut-off a˜, which defines the allocation
of workers between productive sectors. In equilibrium, this cut-off is equal to the equilibrium price,
p1. Workers below this cutoff are overcompensated by p1, since they receive extra rents due to the
information problem. On the other hand, workers above the cut-off a˜ are undercompensated by p1.
For this reason they decide to enter sector 2, where their earnings fully reflect their ability. Hence
in equilibrium, sector 1 is characterized by having the least able workers, as predicted by Akerlof
(1970).
1.3.6 Licensing Policy
As highlighted in section 1.3.5, due to the information problem, only low ability workers enter sector
1, producing low quality goods. Given households preferences, a policy that increases the quality
of good 1 in the market has the potential to improve welfare. Therefore, I analyze the effects of
introducing a licensing policy into the economy. I assume there exists a government agency that sets
up a licensing policy to alleviate the effects of adverse selection on the quality of goods produced in
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sector 1. For the remaining of the chapter, I will also refer to sector 1 and sector 2 of the theoretical
model as the licensed and unlicensed sectors, respectively.
Licensing is made up of two components, a fee that a worker must pay to enter sector 1 and a
training requirement for all workers. I define the licensing policy as Γ = (F, T, τ), where F is the
licensing fee, T is per period equivalent of the required amount of time in training, and τ is the per
period equivalent of the required amount of training content3. Workers that wish to enter sector 1
must pay a cost ψ (a,Γ), that depends on their ability and the licensing policy Γ. I assume that the
license cost is paid in terms of the numeraire good. I explicitly define the cost as:
ψ (a,Γ) = F︸︷︷︸
Fee
+ ψo (a, T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Opportunity Cost of Training
+ ψe (a, τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effort Cost of Training
, (8)
where ψo is the flow value of the opportunity cost of training and ψe is the flow value of the effort
cost of training.4 I make the following assumptions on the opportunity cost of training: ψoa > 0 and
ψoT > 0. This implies that training is costlier the higher the time requirement and the higher the
ability of the worker. Further, I assume that the effort cost of training has the following properties:
ψea < 0 and ψeτ > 0. Given a level of training content, workers of lower ability must exert more
effort in training relative to their higher ability counterparts. Also, as the required training content
increases, then the effort cost of training rises.
Although training is costly, it also has benefits as it improves the productivity of workers within
sector 1. More specifically, I assume that a worker that acquires training through licensing augments
his ability in sector 1 with an exogenous level of skill, g (τ), which is only useful in the quality
production of sector 1. Equation (2) becomes:
x1 (a, τ) = ag (τ) . (9)
Hence, g (τ) captures the sector specific training that workers obtain due to the licensing process.
3Many workers that get a license must earn a certain amount of education or specialized training as well as passing one or
multiple exams.
4In the US, workers incur in the costs of licensing before they enter the licensed occupation. Given that I have a static
framework, I assume that the cost of licensing is paid once as a flow value. For simplicity, I measure the effort cost of training
in terms of resources.
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1.3.7 Characterization of Equilibrium with Licensing Policy
In an economy with licensing, workers that enter the licensed occupation must pay ψ (a,Γ). As a
result, earnings in sector 1 are:
w1 (a) = max
m
p1f1 (m)− rm− ψ (a,Γ) . (10)
Earnings in sector 2 are given by (5), and a worker of ability a solves the problem defined by (6).
I denote Ψ(a,Γ) as the aggregate license cost of workers of type a. I assume that the aggregate
license cost in the economy,
∫ a¯
a
Ψ(a,Γ) I{d(a)=1}dµ (a), is not rebated back to the households.
In an economy characterized by licensing, the competitive equilibrium is given by the following
definition. Given the ability distribution µ (a) and licensing policy Γ, a competitive equilibrium
of the economy with licensing consists of relative price p1, workers’ occupational choice d (a) and
equipment choicemj (a), households’ consumption choices {c1, c2} and beliefs σ (a) such that:
1. Given σ (a) and p1, {c1, c2} solve the households’ problems.
2. Given p1 and Γ, d (a) andmj (a) solve the workers’ problems.
3. Markets clear:
C1 =
∫ a¯
a
m1 (a)θ I{d(a)=1}dµ (a) ,
C2 +
∫ a¯
a
Ψ(a,Γ) I{d(a)=1}dµ (a) =
∫ a¯
a
am2 (a)θ I{d(a)=0}dµ (a) .
4. Beliefs are consistent:
Eσ [x1 (a, τ)] =
∫ a¯
a
ag (τ)m1 (a)θ I{d(a)=1}dµ (a)∫ a¯
a
m1 (a)θ I{d(a)=1}dµ (a)
.
1.4 Data and Calibration
The model is calibrated to match features of the labor market for occupations comprised of workers
with low education levels. I refer to these occupations as low-skilled occupations. By focusing on
these occupations, I use the theoretical model developed in section 1.3 to study product markets as-
sociated with workers of similar skill levels. In this manner, I control for the effect that educational
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attainment can have on occupational choice.5 I use data from the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation (SIPP) 2008 panel and from the O*NET 23.0 Database to construct the sample of workers
in low-skilled occupations. Below, I first describe the construction of my sample, and then I explain
the estimation of my theoretical model.
1.4.1 Data
I use three data sources to define the calibration target moments. The first data set I use is the
2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). This panel is a nationally
representative data set, which was carried out in 16 quarterly waves covering the period between
September 2008 and December 2013. The data set has information on wages, employment and
occupations for a large number of individuals. Each wave has a corresponding topical module. I
link the core data from wave 13 of the SIPP with the data of its corresponding topical module,
the Professional Certifications, Licenses, and Educational Certificates module. This specific wave
corresponds to the period between May and November of 2012 and has been used in two empirical
pioneer studies of the occupational licensing literature, Blair and Chung (2018b) and Gittleman et al.
(2017).6 Using two specific questions from this topical module, I define a worker as licensed in the
same manner as Gittleman et al. (2017). That is, I classify a worker as licensed if he possesses a
professional credential and if this credential was awarded by a federal, state, or local government.7
I follow the criterion of Gittleman et al. (2017) when constructing my sample. I focus on indi-
viduals with ages between 18 and 64 years that are in the civilian labor force. Using data on monthly
earnings, weeks worked, and weekly hours worked, I construct hourly wages and include in the
sample only respondents with hourly wages between $5 and $100. The SIPP collects information on
up to two jobs or up to two businesses for each worker, but does not clarify which of these jobs or
businesses is the relevant one for the credential of the worker. I assume that the credential is relevant
to the job or business for which the worker has the highest wage. Last, I exclude from the sample
workers with imputed data for wages and worker’s who did not provide a response for the credential
relevant questions.8 9
5Hence, I exclude unreasonable comparisons such as an individual choosing between working as a medical doctor, a highly
educated licensed occupation, and a waitress, a low educated unlicensed occupation.
6Gittleman et al. (2017) explain with strong arguments the advantages of using the SIPP data set.
7The two questions that allows me to identify a worker as licensed are: 1) “Do/Does you/he/she have a professional
certification or state or industry license?” and 2) “Who awarded this certification or license?”
8Including imputed wages in the estimation of the wage premium and the skill component in section 1.4.2 would bias
estimates of these premiums towards 0 as explained by Hirsch and Schumacher (2004).
9The non-respondence rate of workers for questions about credential status is 3.3 percent.
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To determine whether an occupation is low or high skilled I use the O*NET 23.0 Database. This
database describes 968 occupations using 277 descriptors. These descriptors are classified into 9
broad categories.10 Information for each descriptor is gathered from either a survey of workers or
from a survey “occupational analysts”. Respondents of the worker survey are asked to report the
required level of education for their occupation. I classify an occupation as low-skilled if “less than
college” is the most common required level of education for the survey respondents of that occupa-
tion, and as high-skilled if “at least college” is the most common response. I link this classification
of occupations by education to the panel of workers of wave 13 of the SIPP.11 Out of the 460 occu-
pations in the SIPP, 325 are low-skilled occupations. These account for 68 percent of all workers.
For my sample of workers in low-skilled occupations, the average monthly earnings is $3,986.
Table 1 presents a set of descriptive statistics for the observations in my sample, separately for li-
censed and unlicensed workers. On average, licensed workers have higher wages, are older, and are
more educated, relative to their unlicensed counterparts. Also, licensed workers have a higher partic-
ipation of women and have a higher number of workers in the government, in a service industry, and
in unions. These patterns are consistent to those found by Blair and Chung (2018b) and Gittleman
et al. (2017).
10The categories are: Knowledge, Skills and Abilities; Education, Experience, and Training; Interests, Work Values, Work
Styles; Tasks; Tools & Technology; Work Activities; Work Context; Related Occupations; Green Occupations.
11Occupations in the O*NET are classified according to the Standard Occupational Classification - SOC. On the other hand,
occupations in the SIPP 2008 are classified with the 2002 Census Code Classification. Using a crosswalk between these two
different occupation code systems, I am able to link my classification of occupations by education to the worker data of the
SIPP panel.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Licensed vs. Unlicensed Workers
Licensed Unlicensed
Number of Observations 8,696 47,831
Average Monthly Wage 4,523 3,886
Average Age 42.8 41.0
Share:
Men 0.49 0.53
Government Workers 0.22 0.11
Services 0.82 0.74
Less than College 0.76 0.83
Union 0.18 0.11
Source: Wave 13 of the SIPP Panel 2008.
Number of observations: 56,527
Note: This table reports summary statistics by licensing status using data from wave 13 of the SIPP Panel 2008. I
restrict the sample to workers with age between 18 and 64 and with hourly wage from $5 to $100. Observations with
imputed wages are dropped.
Carpenter et al. (2012) carry out an in depth analysis of licensing burdens and costs for 102 oc-
cupations. They choose occupations that earn less than the national average of income and are at
least licensed in one state. For each of these occupations they gather information on the different
measures of licensing burdens. In particular, they gather information on different burdens of licens-
ing like fees, amount of time spent on training prior to obtaining a license, number of exams, and
minimum age requirements. As explained in section A.2.1 of the appendix, I back out the fee and
opportunity cost component of the license cost specified in equation (8) using both my sample of
the SIPP and the database of Carpenter et al. (2012). On average, licensed workers in low-skilled
occupations pay a fee of $91 and train for 9 months before they enter a licensed occupation.
1.4.2 Wage Premium Decomposition
The empirical literature on occupational licensing has focused a great deal in understanding the dif-
ferences in wages between licensed and unlicensed occupations. Studies such as Blair and Chung
(2018b), Kleiner (2000), Kleiner and Krueger (2013, 2010), Kleiner and Soltas (2018), among others
have documented a wage premium for licensed workers, even after controlling for skill observables.
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They explain these differences as coming from monopoly or information rents. I document that for
low-skilled occupations the average wage of licensed workers is 16 percent higher than the average
wage of their unlicensed counter parts. Similar to Kleiner (2000), I decompose this wage differ-
ence using a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. Specifically, I regress monthly wages, wi,j on skill
observables, xi,j separately for licensed, j = L, and unlicensed, j = NL, workers:
wi,j = x
′
i,jβj + ui,j . (11)
The skill observables which I control for are gender, education, age, and indicators for union mem-
bership, government workers, and service workers. I decompose the average wage premium into a
skill component and a residual component. The skill component accounts for differences in skills
between licensed and unlicensed workers that are accounted for by the skill observables. Hence, this
component is explained by differences in the general ability of workers and by the specific skills
that licensed workers acquire through the training requirements of licensing. On the other hand,
the residual component accounts for monopoly rents, information rents, and any unobservable skill
differences between licensed and unlicensed workers:
w¯L − w¯NL =
(
x¯
′
L − x¯
′
NL
)
βL︸ ︷︷ ︸
Skill Component
+ x¯
′
NL (βL − βNL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Residual Component
. (12)
Table 2 presents the average wage decomposition results. Of the 16 percent difference in average
wages between licensed and unlicensed workers, 9 percentage points are explained by differences in
skill observables between licensed workers and unlicensed workers.
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Table 2: Wage Premium Decomposition
Wage Premium 0.164
(0.007)
Skill Component 0.090
(0.003)
Residual 0.074
(0.003)
Source: Wave 13 of the SIPP Panel 2008.
Number of observations: 56,527
Estimates are significant at the 1% confidence level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: This table reports the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the average wage premium between
licensed and unlicensed workers. The unit of observation is person-month. The dependent variable
is monthly wage. The human capital regressors are gender, education, age, and indicators for union
membership, government workers, and service workers. I restrict the sample to workers with age
between 18 to 64 andwith hourlywage from $5 to $100. Observationswith imputedwages are dropped.
Wages are normalized by the mean wage of unlicensed workers.
1.4.3 Functional Forms and Assigned Parameters
To calibrate the model, I first specify the ability distribution of workers as a non-standard beta dis-
tribution, betacdf
(
a−a
a¯−a ;αa, βa
)
, with shape parameters αa and βa. The advantage of the beta dis-
tribution is that it has a bounded support as well as being flexible in the shapes it can take, regard-
less of only depending on two parameters. Next, I choose functional forms for households’ utility
U (c1, x1 (a, τ) , c2), the ability augmenting training technology g (τ), and the license cost ψ (a,Γ).
I assume that the utility function is of the following form:
U (c1, x1 (a, τ) , c2) = ρ× x1 (a, τ)× log (c1) + log (c2) . (13)
By assuming a functional form linear in x1 (a), I nest Leland (1979)’s analysis, such that the expected
utility in the households’ problem 7 is given by:12
Eσ [U (c1, x1 (a) , c2)] = ρ× Eσ [x1 (a, τ)]× log (c1) + log (c2) . (14)
12Similar to Leland (1979), the quantity demanded of good 1 satisfies the following properties under this utility specifica-
tion:
∂c∗1
∂p1
< 0,
∂c∗1
∂Eσ [x1 (a, τ)]
> 0.
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Hence, household’s expected utility Parameter ρ determines how important sector 1 good is for the
household. I define the ability augmenting training technology for quality production as:
g (τ) = max {τν , 1} . (15)
This functional form implies that the quality produced by a worker in a licensed occupation cannot
be lower than his ability a, as can be see from (2). Thus, training cannot lower a worker’s ability. I
define the opportunity cost of licensing and the effort training cost licensing as:
ψo (a, T ) = w2 (a)T, (16)
ψe (a, τ) = τ
(
a¯− a
a¯
)γ
. (17)
The opportunity cost is the product of a worker’s wage in sector 2, the unlicensed sector, and the per
period equivalent of the training time requirement. The effort training cost is decreasing in ability,
a, and increasing in the per period equivalent of the training content requirement, τ . Parameter γ
governs how much more effort a worker of ability a must exert in training relative to the highest
ability worker, a¯.
The list of assigned parameters are given in Table 3. I set r, the price of equipment, so that it
implies a period discount rate of 0.996.13 Hence the price of renting equipment is equal to 0.003.
I set the output elasticity of equipment, θ, to match the average of the labor income share between
2010 and 2016 for the United States. Using my sample from the SIPP and the database provided by
Carpenter et al. (2012), I calculate the per period equivalent of the license fee, F , and the per period
equivalent of the training time requirement, T . This is explained in further detail in section A.2.1 of
the appendix.
13This discount rate is used to calculate the flow values of the license cost components, as explained in section A.2.1 of the
appendix.
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Table 3: Assigned Parameters
Parameter Value Description Source
r 0.003 Price of Equipment Implies discount rate of 0.996
1− θ 0.54 Labor income share BEA 2010-2016
T 0.04 Training time requirement SIPP, Carpenter et al. (2012)
F 3.94 License fee SIPP, Carpenter et al. (2012)
r is monthly real interest rate. F is the per period equivalent of the present discounted value of total licensing fees and T
is the per period equivalent of the training time requirement.
1.4.4 Internally Calibrated Parameters
I calibrate the parameters associated with the ability distribution, the utility function, and training
to match wages and employment moments from my sample. I report the parameter values from
the calibration in Table 4. Although parameters are jointly calibrated, there are some data moments
that are more informative about specific parameters. The ability distribution parameters, αa and
βa are pinned down primarily by the mean and standard deviation of wages from my sample. The
parameter ρ controls the weight that the sector 1 good has in the utility function. Hence, ρ determines
the quantity demanded of good 1. In equilibrium, the quantity demanded of good 1 is directly related
to the amount of workers that supply that good. For this reason, this parameter is primarily pinned
down by the share of licensed workers.
The effort training cost, (17), acts as an heterogeneous barrier to entry of workers into licensed
occupations. Both τ , the training content requirement, and γ, the parameter that governs the rela-
tive effort exerted in training by a worker, shape the severity of the heterogeneous barrier to entry.
In the model, there is a direct implication that changes in the severity of the effort training cost of
licensing yields changes in the composition of ability between licensed and unlicensed sectors. Fur-
thermore, changes in the ability composition result in changes in the wage premium and in the share
of household income that corresponds to licensed workers. Hence these parameters are primarily
pinned down to match the 16 percent wage premium between licensed and unlicensed workers and
the income share of licensed workers of 18 percent.
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Table 4: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target Moments Model Data
Distribution:
αa 1.06 Mean - wages 3,986 3,986
βa 2.71 St. Dev. - wages 2,194 2,194
Utility:
ρ 0.24 Share of lic. workers 0.154 0.154
Training:
τ 888 Wage premium 1.164 1.164
γ 7.54 Income share of lic. workers 0.175 0.175
ν 0.02 Skill component 1.090 1.090
Training also provides benefits for licensed workers. As can be seen from equations (2) and
(15), the quality a worker produces is determined by his ability a and sectors-specific skills g (τ).
Parameter ν determines the amount of sector-specific skills that licensed workers obtain from the
training content requirement, τ . In section 1.4.2, I decompose the wage premium of licensed workers
into differences in skills between sectors, the skill component, and a residual component. In the
model, differences in skill between sectors is determined by the composition of ability between these
and by the sector-specific skills obtained through training. Given this, parameter ν is mainly pinned
down by the skill component of the wage premium decomposition.
1.5 Licensing Policy in the US
As I explained in section 1.4, I set parameters of my model to match labor market moments of
low-skilled occupations. Using this calibration, I am able to characterize the allocation of workers
between licensed and unlicensed occupations for the United States. Figure 1 portrays the distribution
of ability for my model calibration. Workers with ability a ∈ [aˆ, a˜] are allocated in the licensed
sector, ability interval that accounts for 15 percent of all workers. Workers below ability aˆ are those
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for which obtaining the license is too costly. Hence, the licensing policy excludes workers of very
low ability from entering the licensed sector, as licensing is more costly for them in terms of effort.
On the other hand, workers with ability above a˜ enter the unlicensed sector. The reason for this is
that, in the licensed sector, the earnings of these workers do not not fully compensate them for their
high ability. Thus, they choose to enter the unlicensed sector where their earnings fully reflect their
productivity.
The current licensing policy ameliorates the effects of the information asymmetry on the quality
of licensed sector goods, in comparison to a no licensing policy. It does this through two channels.
First, licensing policy has effects on the quality of licensed goods by affecting how workers sort
between the licensed and unlicensed sectors given their ability, a, and the license cost. In other
words, licensing policy determines the composition of ability a between both sectors. This is the
sorting channel I introduced earlier. As can be seen in Figure 1, the current US licensing policy
improves the quality of licensed goods in the market by excluding the low ability workers from
entering the licensed sector and by incentivizing higher ability workers to enter that sector. Of the
workers in the licensed sector, only 27 percent have ability that is higher than the average ability of
all workers. Second, quality also improves due to the specific skills obtained through the content
of training, which augments ability of workers in the licensed sector in 13 percent. I refer to this
channel as the sector-specific skills channel.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Ability and Allocation of Workers - Current Licensing Policy
In my calibration strategy, I match the skill component between the licensed and unlicensed
sector, which I estimate in section 1.4.2. Using my model, I decompose how much of the skill
component is explained by the sorting channel and how much is explained by the sector-specific
skills channel. For the sorting channel, the average ability of workers in the licensed sector is 15
percent lower than the average ability of unlicensed workers. With respect to the sector-specific
skills channel, training improves the productivity of workers in the licensed sector by 24 percent.
The sum of these two components gives the 9 percentage point difference in skills between licensed
and unlicensed workers.
Licensing policy also generates a dead weight loss for the economy as households have to spend
a portion of their income in license costs. Given the current licensing policy, licensed workers spend
25 percent of their gross earnings on license costs. Of the total license costs in the economy, the effort
cost of training accounts for 88 percent, the opportunity cost of training training for accounts for 11
percent, and license fees only account for 1 percent. Hence, the training components of licensing
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are the entry barriers which account for most of the deadweight loss of licensing. Given that license
costs are paid in units of good 2, I find that they account for 2.8 percent of the output of this good.
1.6 Counterfactual Policy Analysis
In this section, I evaluate the effects of changing the current licensing policy onwelfare, the allocation
of labor, and the wage premium. First, I explain the measure of welfare I use. Then, I study different
counterfactual licensing policies in which I vary training requirements as well as license fees.
1.6.1 Welfare Measure
To study the effects of different licensing policies on welfare I consider the following welfare mea-
sure. I define the current licensing policy in the US as ΓB . I compare all the counterfactual results to
this benchmark. Let ΓN be any counterfactual licensing policy. I measure the difference in welfare
between the two economies using a consumption equivalent transfer, ω, in terms of the unlicensed
good:
ρ×Eσ [x1 (a, τ)]B × log
(
cB1
)
+ log
(
cB2 (1 + ω)
)
= ρ×Eσ [x1 (a, τ)]N × log
(
cN1
)
+ log
(
cN2
)
.
The interpretation of ω is the following. Consider two economies, one under the benchmark policy,
ΓB , and another under the new licensing policy, ΓN . Welfare between the two economies would
be equal if the households’ consumption of the unlicensed good changed in ω × 100 percent for the
current US economy under the benchmark licensing policy, ΓB . In the model, the license cost is
paid in terms of the numeraire good, which is the unlicensed good. For this reason, I choose the
consumption equivalent to be in terms of this good.
1.6.2 No Training
In this section, I evaluate the effects of eliminating training from the licensing requirements. That
is, I set the training time requirement to T = 0 and the training content requirement to τ = 0, while
keeping the license fee, F , at its calibrated value. Figure 2 shows the ability allocation of workers for
the benchmark policy and for the no training counterfactual policy. A change in the licensing policy
generates a change in the composition of ability between the licensed and the unlicensed sector. In
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particular, a no training policy shuts off the heterogeneous portion of the license cost in (8). By
eliminating the effort training cost, lower ability workers become licensed since they only have to
pay a small licensing fee instead of paying the large training cost associated with their ability type in
the benchmark licensing policy. As a result, the relative price falls since the supply of the licensed
good increases as more workers enter this sector. Given this, higher ability workers are not fully
compensated anymore in the licensed sector, and decide to produce in the unlicensed sector.
By eliminating training, quality is affected through both the sorting channel and the sector-
specific skills channel. The sorting channel is clearly depicted in Figure 2. By eliminating the effort
training cost, low ability workers are no longer excluded from the licensed sector. Also, a lower
equilibrium relative price incentivizes higher ability workers to exit the licensed sector. This change
in the composition of ability between both sectors results in lower quality goods being produced,
since the licensed sector is now comprised of lower ability workers. When training is eliminated,
the sector-specific skills channel is shut-off so that g (τ) = 1. Thus, quality also falls since ability is
not augmented by training anymore. It is important to note that the license fee by itself is not able
to generate the sorting effect seen in Figure 2. This is because the fee is small and also because it
affects all workers homogeneously. Hence, as it cannot exclude low ability workers from entering
the licensed sector, then it is not able to alleviate the negative effect of the information asymmetry
on the quality of the licensed good.
Figure 2: Distribution of Ability and Allocation of Workers - Benchmark vs. No Training
(a) ΓB : Benchmark (b) ΓN : No Training
Moving from the benchmark policy to a counterfactual policy leads to a change in welfare that
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is due to changes in the average quality of the licensed good, Eσ [x1 (a, τ)] and in the consumption
quantities of both goods, {c1, c2} . As shown in Table 5, if the US was to implement a no training
counterfactual policy, then consumer welfare would fall in 3.9 percent. When moving from the
benchmark to the no training policy, the sorting channel and the sector-specific skills channel are
eliminated. This results in a reduction in average quality that implies a 11.1 percent drop in welfare.
On the other hand, the quantities consumed of both goods increase. For the licensed sector good, c1
increases since there is a larger number of workers producing in the licensed sector, as can be seen in
the first column of Table 6. Although there is a larger number of units consumed of the licensed good,
the fall in welfare that comes from the reduction in quality is only offset by 0.1%. On the contrary,
consumer welfare improves by 7.1 percent through a higher consumption of good 2. In equilibrium
there is a higher quantity of good 2 because both demand and supply is higher for that good. Since
quality falls the relative weight of good 2 in the expected utility (14) increases, which implies a higher
demand for that good relative to the benchmark policy. Supply for that good increases since higher
ability workers are now allocated in sector 2, which implies that output is larger. Overall, I find that
eliminating training requirements from the licensing policy has a negative impact on the economy.
Although welfare increases since more resources are now allocated towards quantity consumption,
removing training requirements is also costly since lower quality licensed goods are produced. The
latter effect is stronger than the former, resulting in the overall fall in consumer welfare.
Table 5: Decomposition of Change in Welfare - No Training (%)
∆Welfare Quality of j = 1 Quantity of j = 1 Quantity of j = 2
-3.9 -11.1 0.1 7.1
There are large effects on the labor market from eliminating training from the licensing policy as
can be observed from Table 6 and Table 7. There is an increase in 7 percentage points in the share of
licensed workers. Since lower ability workers allocate into the licensed sector, average ability of that
sector falls in 38 percent. Furthermore, licensed workers’ average productivity falls even more, in
51 percent, since sector-specific skills have been eliminated. On the other hand, as workers of higher
ability enter sector 2, the average ability of its workers improves which implies a higher production
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of sector 2 goods.
Table 6: Change in Labor Allocation - No Training (%)
Share of Workers j = 1 Average Ability in j = 1 Average Ability in j = 2
37.9 -38.3 8.8
The fall in the wage premium is large, when moving from the benchmark policy to the no training
policy. Under this counterfactual policy, workers in the unlicensed sector are paid more than twice as
much as their licensed counterparts. The fall in the wage premium is mainly driven by a considerable
drop in the skill component. Furthermore, 78 percent of the reduction in the skill component is
accounted for by the sorting channel and the other 22 percent corresponds to sector-specific skills
channel. The effect of the fall of the skill component on the wage premium is offset by an increase
in information rents of 12.9 percent, which is explained by the fact that lower ability workers are
overcompensated more in the absence of training.
Table 7: Decomposition of Change in Wage Premium - No Training (%)
∆Wage Premium ∆ Skill Component ∆ Information Rents
-94.9 -107.8 12.9
1.6.3 Different Levels of Training Content
In this section, I consider different counterfactual licensing policies that vary on the training require-
ment
(
τN , TN
)
while keeping the license fee fixed at its calibrated value. In particular, a policy that
doubles the training requirement means that both the training content, τN , and time, TN , require-
ments are doubled with respect to the benchmark policy,
(
τB , TB
)
. Figure 3 portrays the percent
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change in consumer welfare for different levels of training requirements relative to the benchmark
licensing policy. I find that the optimal training policy is to increase training requirements by a factor
of eight. This number is relatively big, but this is a result of two assumptions I have made on the
opportunity cost and license fees when carrying out the quantitative analysis.
Figure 3: Effect of Training Requirements on Consumer Welfare
First, as explained in sectionA.2.1 of the appendix, I assume that workers only train once through-
out their lifetimes. In doing so, I am taking a conservative stance on the calibration of the opportunity
cost of training. Many licensing boards require workers to carry-out continuous training in order for
them to renew their license. Hence, the value of TB in my calibration exercise is lower than what
it should be. I have made this assumption given that there is no reliable data on the amount of time
workers have to spend on training in order to renew their license. Second, also as explained in section
A.2.1, when I calculate the per period equivalent of license fees and training time requirements, I as-
sume that workers on average spend 40 years working. By assuming this, the per period equivalents
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of license fees and the opportunity cost of licensing are small throughout my quantitative analysis.
Table 8: Decomposition of Change in Welfare - Optimal Training (%)
∆Welfare Quality of j = 1 Quantity of j = 1 Quantity of j = 2
2.6 7.9 -1.7 -3.6
If the USwas to move to the optimal training requirement, then consumer welfare would increase
in 2.6 percent as seen in Table 8. The mechanics behind this welfare change is similar to the no
training counterfactual policy analysis. Quality improves due to the sorting channel and the sector-
specific skills channel. With respect to the sorting channel, as the effort training cost becomes higher
relative to the benchmark, it becomes even costlier for lower ability workers to pay the license cost.
As a result, less workers enter the licensed sector which leads to a reduction in the supply of licensed
goods and a higher relative price. The increment in the price incentivizes higher ability workers to
enter the licensed sector. As can be seen in Figure 27 of the appendix, higher ability workers enter
the licensed sector under the optimal licensing policy in comparison to the benchmark. The effect
of the sector-specific skills channel on quality is straight forward. Since workers receive higher
content requirements, then they produce higher quality goods. This increase in the quality raises
welfare by 7.9 percent.The positive effect on welfare from raising quality is offset by a reduction in
the consumption of quantities of both goods. By raising training requirements to the optimal level,
household’s have to spend more resources on license costs. Given this, they consume less of both
goods and welfare is reduced by 5.3 percent.
Figure 4 portrays the effects of different training policies on the labor market. Panel (a) of Figure
4 shows that as training requirements become higher, less workers enter the licensed sector resulting
a drop in the share of licensed workers. As training requirements become higher, it is costlier for
lower ability workers to enter the licensed sector and it is more profitable for higher ability workers
to become licensed. Since higher ability workers have a lower density then the number of licensed
workers reduces as license training requirements rise. Panel (b) of Figure 4, shows that as training
requirements rise the wage premium also rises. This result is driven by the fact that higher training
requirements increase the skill component of the wage premium.
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Figure 4: Effect of Training Requirements on the Labor Market
(a) Share of Licensed Workers (b) Wage Premium
Moving to the optimal training policy implies a reduction of 4.4 percentage points in the share of
licensed workers. Tables 18 and 19 in the appendix show the effects on the labor market of moving
to the optimal licensing policy. Average ability in the licensed sector increases in 22.7 percent while
average ability of unlicensed workers falls by 3.2 percent. Also, under the optimal training policy, the
wage premium increases in 63.5 percent relative to the benchmark, mainly driven by a 55.9 increase
in the skill component. The increase in the skill component is driven in 86 percent by the sorting
channel and in 14 percent by sector-specific skills channel.
1.6.4 No License Fee
In this section, I evaluate the effects of eliminating the license fee, while keeping the training require-
ments at the same level as in the benchmark licensing policy. As stated in section 1.5, license fees
only account for 1 percent of total license costs. For this reason, a licensing policy that only removes
license fees generates little effect on the economy. Table 9 shows that eliminating license fees only
yields a 0.1 percent increase in welfare relative to the benchmark economy. This change in welfare
is driven by a higher quantity of licensed goods being consumed, as eliminating fees implies that
more workers enter licensed occupations. However, since fees are small, then only very few work-
ers switch from the unlicensed to the licensed sector. The ability composition of workers remains
very similar to the benchmark economy as can be seen in Figure 28 in the appendix. This shows
that changes in license fees are less important for the sorting channel in comparison to changes in
training requirements. This is because license fees affect all workers homogeneously, while training
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affects workers differently depending on their ability. As a result, the heterogeneous training costs
have larger effects on the composition of abilities between sectors. For this reason, eliminating only
license fees has very little effect on the labor market, as can be seen in Tables 20 and 21 of the
appendix.
Table 9: Decomposition of Change in Welfare - No Fee (%)
∆Welfare Quality of j = 1 Quantity of j = 1 Quantity of j = 2
0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
1.7 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the effects of occupational licensing on welfare and labor
market outcomes. To do this, I set up a theoretical framework with information asymmetries in the
product market and occupational choice in the labor market. Workers choose occupations based on
their ability and the licensing policy. By explicitly modeling the information asymmetry, there is a
potential welfare improving role for licensing in the economy. Licensing is modeled as an entry fee
and as costly training. I calibrate the model to match specific moments of the US using the 2008 SIPP
panel and the O*NET database. I control for differences in education, by calibrating the model to
only occupations composed mainly of workers with less than college education. Using the calibrated
model, I carry out counterfactual licensing policy analysis. I find that implementing a no training
policy leads to a welfare loss of 3.9 percent. Also, the wage premium drops by more than half. I find
that these results are driven by changes in the composition of ability of workers between the licensed
and unlicensed sector, which I refer to as the sorting channel.
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2 CorporateTaxRates,Allocative Efficiency, andAggregate Pro-
ductivity
2.1 Introduction
Corporate tax regulation generates heterogeneity in the effective tax rates faced by firms due to
exemptions, deductions, and deferrals. At the same time, there is a large amount of dispersion in
firm-level productivity even within narrowly defined industries. As a result, effective corporate tax
rates can potentially generate an inefficient allocation of resources across firms, which directly affects
total factor productivity (TFP).
This chapter quantifies the effect of effective corporate tax rates on aggregate TFP through al-
locative efficiency. First, we use Chilean manufacturing census data for the years 1998 to 2007 and
document several characteristics of the effective tax rate distribution. Two important findings are a
large dispersion in the effective tax rate faced by firms and a mass of firms with a 0 percent tax rate.
Next, we incorporate these features into a standard monopolistic competition model with capital and
output wedges, where firms endogenously choose the tax rate they face. We then calibrate the model
and find that if there were no corporate taxes in the economy, TFP would increase between 4 and 11
percent. Afterward, we study the effects of imposing the same tax rate on all firms, which we call a
flat tax rate policy. We find a monotonically decreasing relationship between the level of the flat tax
rate and TFP.
This chapter contributes mostly to the misallocation literature pioneered by Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). This stream of literature documents large differences in
TFP through the resource allocation channel. Following the categorization proposed in the survey
by Restuccia and Rogerson (2017), the literature has studied misallocation via two approaches. The
direct approach selects a factor that can potentially cause misallocation and measures its effects on
allocative efficiency and TFP. Examples of such factors are financial frictions, firing costs, and size-
dependent policies. The indirect approach tries to measure the net effect of all the possible factors
that generate misallocation without specifying a definite source. One caveat with this approach
is that any misspecification of the theoretical model used to measure misallocation can potentially
overstate it. We combine these two approaches by identifying a specific factor of misallocation,
effective corporate tax rates, while also accounting for all other possible latent factors that could
generate misallocation or model misspecification. By taking this approach, we are able to study
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the effect of heterogeneous effective corporate tax rates while accounting for any other distortion or
model misspecification.
To carry out our analysis, we use the ENIA (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual), a plant-level
manufacturing census from Chile that covers all establishments with more than 10 employees, for
the time period 1998-2007.14 The data set is an unbalanced panel that contains detailed balance
sheet and production information. Importantly, it specifies net after-tax firm income and corporate
taxes paid by firms. We use these two variables to construct the average effective tax rates faced by
firms, which is essential for our analysis. The advantage of this effective tax rate measure is that
it summarizes all the subtleties of the tax code into one measure. One drawback is that there may
be endogeneity between firm choices and characteristics and the firm specific tax rate. We perform
several exercises to address this drawback and find that our results do not change.
To study the impact of firm-specific corporate tax rates onTFP, we develop a small open economy
model where firms are heterogeneous in their productivity. Firms can choose whether to face a
positive exogenous tax and have non-negative accounting profits or face a 0 percent tax and have
non-positive accounting profits. This feature incorporates a specific exemption present in the Chilean
tax code, which establishes that firms with non-positive profits face a corporate tax rate of 0 percent.
This exemption is relevant since it affects around 20 percent of firms in our sample. Bymodeling this
exemption, we intend to partially address the concern that firms’behavior can affect their effective tax
rate. We also introduce firm-specific capital and output wedges to account for all other distortions and
model misspecification. If we did not explicitly model the corporate tax rate, it would be accounted
for by the capital and output wedges. By introducing it, we are stripping away its contribution to the
wedges.
Using the data described above, we back out the capital and output wedges necessary to ratio-
nalize firms’ observed choices of inputs. We then take these wedges as primitives and measure the
change in aggregate output of implementing different flat tax policies relative to the observed tax
policy. Last, we measure how much of this output change is generated by intrasectoral allocative ef-
ficiency, intersectoral reallocation of resources, and changes in the demand of resources. We define
the contribution of intrasectoral allocative efficiency to the change in aggregate output as the TFP
gap.
We find that if corporate taxes are removed, there is a positive TFP gap ranging from 4 to 11
14Different years of this data set have been used in several well-known studies, such as Liu (1993), Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003), Oberfield (2013), Petrin and Sivadasan (2013), and Asker et al. (2014).
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percentage points, depending on the year analyzed. Moreover, this gap decreases monotonically
with the level of the flat tax rate and becomes negative after a threshold that varies with the year. We
conclude that as the tax level increases, more resources are going to less productive firms. We also
find that the revenue-neutral flat tax policy generates small changes in TFP. The contribution to the
change in aggregate output of the intersectoral component is small relative to the TFP gap in every
year and policy analyzed. Last, we perform several robustness checks to reinforce our results.
This chapter is related to an ongoing literature that tries to identify the main drivers of mis-
allocation of resources and its effects on TFP.15 One factor analyzed in many studies is financial
development. Examples of these studies are Midrigan and Xu (2014) and Gopinath et al. (2017).
The quantitative impact of this factor on aggregate TFP varies depending on the study. For example,
Midrigan and Xu (2014) find that the effect is at most 10 percent in South Korea. Gopinath et al.
(2017) document an increase in capital misallocation in the south of Europe and find that financial
frictions can explain this fact. The effect on TFP is around 3 percent. Another possible source of
misallocation is firing costs. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) find that imposing a one-year firing
cost in the United States would lead to a 2 percent drop in TFP. This drop is due to the misallocation
of labor across firms and changes in the establishment productivity distribution. We contribute to this
literature by studying how the dispersion and level of corporate tax rates affect aggregate productiv-
ity. Moreover, we do this by using a direct measure of this friction. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first attempt to measure the effects of effective corporate tax rates on TFP through allocative
efficiency at the firm level.
A strand of the literature argues that the dispersion in marginal products is a reflection of specific
characteristics of the economic environment. David et al. (2016) study how information frictions
show up as dispersion in marginal products. In their framework, firms face imperfect information
when they make their input decisions and find losses in aggregate productivity for the United States,
China, and India. Other environment specifications that yield dispersion in marginal revenue prod-
ucts are adjustment costs of capital, multiple production technologies, and different demand speci-
fications.16 Although these restrictions could generate dispersion, they do not imply misallocation,
as a benevolent planner would face these same physical constraints when allocating resources. In
15See Hopenhayn (2014) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2017) for a recent survey of this literature.
16Asker et al. (2014) find that adjustment costs can generate dispersion inmarginal revenue products. Rossbach andAsturias
(2017) analyze the impact of multiple production technologies on the dispersion of marginal products using the same data
set used in our analysis. Haltiwanger et al. (2018) analyze how different demand specifications can show up as dispersion in
revenue TFP.
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our study, we take these factors into account by allowing corporate tax rates to interact with firm-
specific output and capital wedges. These wedges are a reduced form of controlling for all frictions
and model misspecification not accounted for in our theoretical framework.
Finally, this chapter contributes to the broad literature that studies the effects of effective cor-
porate tax rates in macroeconomic aggregates. This literature mainly studies how corporate taxes
affect investment and entrepreneurship. The general finding is that corporate taxation has signifi-
cant adverse effects on both investment and entrepreneurship.17 One study that analyzes the Chilean
economy is Hsieh and Parker (2007). The authors argue that the main cause of the investment boom
in Chile in the last part of the eighties and nineties was due to a tax reform from 1984 through 1986
that cut the tax rate of retained profits from 50 percent to 10 percent. While these papers focus on
investment and growth, our analysis is on the allocative effects of corporate tax rates.
2.2 Description of the Data
This section describes the data used in this chapter and presents facts about the effective corporate
tax rate distribution in Chile.
2.2.1 The Annual Census of the Chilean Manufacturing Sector: ENIA
The data used are taken from the ENIA (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual), an annual census of
the Chilean manufacturing sector. This data set is an unbalanced panel that covers all manufacturing
plants with more than 10 employees and plants with less than 10 employees that belong to firms
with multiple establishments. We use data for the period 1998-2007, as there were no reforms to the
Chilean tax code in this time frame, except for pre-stipulated increases in the statutory tax rate. Table
10 shows the statutory tax rate for each year in our sample. After 2007, the ENIA’s panel structure is
eliminated, so that firms cannot be identified across years. For this reason, we do not use data after
2007, as doing so would have limited some of our quantitative exercises.
The ENIA collects data on revenue, net accounting profit, profit tax, employment, wage bill,
fixed assets, and industry among other variables useful for our quantitative analysis. Previous ver-
sions of this census have been used in many studies, given its rich plant-level data. In Chile, the
manufacturing sector accounted for roughly 17 percent of value added and 14 percent of employ-
ment for the period 1998-2007. Further details on the construction and representativeness of our
17See Djankov et al. (2010) and the references within.
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sample can be found in Section B.1 of the appendix.
2.2.2 Profit Tax Facts in Chile
In this section, we document relevant tax facts about Chile. In Chile, all firms are subject to the
same statutory tax rate, regardless of their level of profits. The ENIA collects plant-level data on net
accounting profits and profit tax expenses. Using these two variables, we calculate the effective tax
rate that each firm faces in a given year, as the ratio between profit tax expenses and gross accounting
profits.18 For the years of our sample, the statutory tax rate increased from 15 percent to 17 percent.
The effective profit tax rate that firms face has considerable dispersion, as seen in Table 10. This
dispersion is generated by several exemptions outlined in the Chilean tax law, as well as fines for
late payments and tax base revaluations to match economic activity with financial payments.
An important feature of the distribution of effective tax rates in Chile is that, on average, 30
percent of firms face a 0 percent tax rate. This feature is mainly driven by the tax code exemption
that specifies that firms with non-positive accounting profits face a corporate tax rate equal to 0
percent.19 We also document that 75 percent of plants have an effective tax rate below or equal to
the statutory tax rate, as can be seen in Table 10.
A plant may face an effective tax rate lower than the statutory tax rate because of loss carryfor-
ward, tax base revaluations, and other exemptions. Plants that face an effective tax rate that is higher
than the statutory tax rate do so mainly for two reasons: late payment fines and tax base revaluations.
Late payment fines range from 10 percent to 30 percent depending on how long it takes the plant to
pay the amount owed. Plants also pay 1.5 percent interest per month on their debt. Taxes paid by
tax base revaluations are technically called “deferred taxes”. These tax base revaluations arise from
analyzing the differences, mostly temporary, between taxable and accounting profit.
18Gross accounting profits is the sum of profit tax expenses and net accounting profits.
19On average, 18 percent of the firms in our sample have non-positive profits.
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Table 10: Distribution of Effective Profit Tax Rates (%)
Year
Statutory Tax
Rate
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Standard
Deviation
1998 15 0 12.14 15.78 25.79 13.95
1999 15 0 12.03 15.63 24.81 13.90
2000 15 0 10.95 15.04 22.98 12.87
2001 15 0 9.69 15.01 22.06 12.79
2002 16 0 8.68 16.00 21.10 12.56
2003 16.5 0 11.31 16.58 23.19 13.44
2004 17 0 13.45 17.00 22.97 12.52
2005 17 0 14.08 17.02 22.76 12.86
2006 17 0 14.53 17.20 23.58 12.76
2007 17 0 13.99 17.11 24.08 13.19
The last column of Table 10 presents the standard deviation of corporate tax rates for every year
of our sample. To address the issue that the dispersion in tax rates may be driven by tax exemptions
targeted at firms with a specific characteristic, we decompose the variance of corporate tax rates
into within-group and between-group components. We group firms by observables provided in the
ENIA, such as size, region, industry, and business entity type. Table 11 shows the average share
of the within- and between-group components of the variance of corporate tax rates. For all group
categorizations considered, the within-group component accounts for more than 97 percent of the
total variance.
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Table 11: Variance Decomposition of Corporate Taxes (%)
Observable: Within-Group Component Between-Group Component
Size by Employment 98.79 1.21
Size by Sales 98.54 1.46
Size by Value Added 98.55 1.45
Region 99.15 0.85
Business Entity Type 97.14 2.86
Industry 98.77 1.23
Notes. This table portrays the share of the within-group and between-group components of the variance averaged for the period 1998-2007. Size categories for employment, sales, and value added are
according to the standard categorization of the ENIA. There are 9 groups for employment and 10 groups for sales and value added. Firms are classified into 12 region groups and 8 types of business
entities. Last, we group firms by two-digit industries according to the ISIC Rev. 3 industry classification.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
This section develops the theoretical framework that will allow us to evaluate the effect of corporate
profit tax rates on resource allocations and its impact on TFP. We set up a standard monopolistic
competition model with firm-specific output and capital wedges and firm-specific profit tax rates.
We then explain the calibration of key parameters and the measurement of the variables that will be
used in our quantitative analysis.
2.3.1 Monopolistic Competition Model
We consider a static monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms. We assume a small
open economy with inelastic aggregate labor supply L¯. There is a single final good Y produced by
a representative firm in a perfectly competitive output market. The representative firm’s production
function is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator, and it uses output Ys of industries s ∈ {1, ..., S} as inputs:
Y =
S∏
s=1
Y θss ,
S∑
s=1
θs = 1, (18)
and Ps is the price of industry s.
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Industry output is a CES aggregator ofMs differentiated products with elasticity parameter σ:
Ys =
(
Ms∑
i=1
Y
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
. (19)
Differentiated product firms are heterogeneous in their physical productivity,Asi. Their produc-
tion function is given by
Ysi = AsiKαssi L
1−αs
si , (20)
whereKsi andLsi are the capital and labor inputs, respectively, andαs is the capital share of industry
s.
These firms maximize economic profit, which is the sum of accounting profit and the opportunity
cost of capital. We make this distinction since corporate tax rates directly affect accounting profits.
Note that in the data, a firm’s tax rate is obtained as the product of the statutory tax rate and the
tax base. A firm’s tax base is a function of its accounting profits and the exemptions, deductions,
and deferrals specified by the tax code. One exemption that we model explicitly is that firms with
non-positive accounting profits face a 0 percent tax.
We model this exemption as follows. If a firm’s accounting profit is non-negative, then the firm
faces a profit tax rate, which we denote as tsi. This tax rate is exogenous and taken as given by the
firm. On the other hand, if a firm has non-positive accounting profit, then its effective tax rate is equal
to 0. Hence, a firm must choose whether to face a positive profit tax rate tsi and have non-negative
accounting profit or a 0 profit tax rate with non-positive accounting profit.
Given this, the firm’s problem is to maximize economic profit:
pisi = max
{
pitsi, pi
0
si
}
,
where pitsi is the economic profit of a firm that faces profit tax rate tsi, conditioned on non-negative
accounting profit, and pi0si is the economic profit of a firm that faces a profit tax of 0, conditioned on
non-positive accounting profit. We express accounting profit as
piAsi = PsiYsi − wLsi − (δ + λr)Ksi + Γsi, (21)
where λ is the fraction of capital that is financed by debt and Γsi is non-operational income net of
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non-operational costs.20
If a firm faces profit tax rate tsi, economic profit pitsi is
pitsi = max{Ksi, Lsi}
piAsi (1− tsi)− τ˜Y siPsiYsi − (1− λ) rKsi − τ˜Ksi (r + δ)Ksi
s.t. piAsi ≥ 0
(
µtsi
)
,
where µtsi is the Lagrange multiplier for the accounting profit’s non-negativity constraint.
Maximization yields the following first-order conditions:
MRPKsi ≡ αsσ − 1
σ
PsiYsi
Ksi
= r (1− λtsi + τ˜Ksi + λµ
t
si) + δ (1− tsi + τ˜Ksi + µtsi)
1− tsi − τ˜Y si + µtsi
, (22)
MRPLsi ≡ (1− αs) σ − 1
σ
PsiYsi
Lsi
= w (1− tsi + µ
t
si)
1− tsi − τ˜Y si + µtsi
. (23)
If a firm faces profit tax rate 0, economic profit pi0si is
pi0si = max{Ksi, Lsi}
piAsi − τ˜Y siPsiYsi − (1− λ) rKsi − τ˜Ksi (r + δ)Ksi
s.t. piAsi ≤ 0
(
µ0si
)
,
where µ0si is the Lagrange multiplier for the accounting profit’s non-positivity constraint.
Maximization yields the following first-order conditions:
MRPKsi ≡ αsσ − 1
σ
PsiYsi
Ksi
=
r
(
1 + τ˜Ksi − λµ0si
)
+ δ
(
1 + τ˜Ksi − µ0si
)
1− τ˜Y si − µ0si
, (24)
MRPLsi ≡ (1− αs) σ − 1
σ
PsiYsi
Lsi
=
w
(
1− µ0si
)
1− τ˜Y si − µ0si
. (25)
20The parameter λ is exogenous and constant across firms in our quantitative analysis. Γsi allows us to match accounting
profits in the model to those in the data. We assume that it is firm specific and does not depend on the input choices of the
firm.
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Similar to Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Foster et al. (2008), we define revenue-based factor pro-
ductivity as TFPRsi ≡ PsiAsi. Under a Cobb-Douglas production function, this can be expressed
as
TFPRsi =
σ
σ − 1
(
MRPKsi
αs
)αs (MRPLsi
1− αs
)1−αs
. (26)
From equations (22)-(25), we observe that firms’marginal products differ when they face differ-
ent wedges and profit tax rates. Importantly, we assume that tax rates do not affect capital and output
wedges. However, the tax rate interacts with the wedges in the marginal products of the firm. If we
were to set wedges and taxes to zero, then all firms would have the same marginal products. Given
this, equation (26) shows that revenue productivity would also equalize across firms. On the con-
trary, when firms face different wedges and profit taxes, there is dispersion in revenue productivity.
Furthermore, firms with higher TFPRsi are those that have higher wedges, raising their marginal
products and lowering their capital, labor, and output levels.
The industry-weighted average of firms’ revenue productivity, marginal product of capital, and
marginal product of labor are denoted as TFPRs,MRPKs, andMRPLs, respectively. Using the
above framework, we construct the aggregate measures for capital, labor, TFP, and output. First, we
express the equilibrium allocations for sectoral resources,Ks and Ls, as
Ks =
Ms∑
i=1
Ksi = K · ωKs , (27)
Ls =
Ms∑
i=1
Lsi = L · ωLs , (28)
where K =
∑S
s=1Ks is aggregate capital, L =
∑S
s=1 Ls is aggregate labor, ω
K
s is the sectoral
share of capital, and ωLs is the sectoral share of labor. Sectoral shares have the following expression:
ωKs =
αsθs/MRPKs∑S
s′=1 αs′θs′/MRPKs′
(29)
ωLs =
(1− αs) θs/MRPLs∑S
s′=1 (1− αs′) θs′/MRPLs′
. (30)
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We derive industry productivity as
TFPs =
[
Ms∑
i=1
(
Asi
TFPRs
TFPRsi
)σ−1] 1σ−1
. (31)
Last, aggregate output can be expressed as a function ofKs, Ls, and TFPs:
Y =
S∏
s=1
(
TFPs ·Kαss · L(1−αs)s
)θs
. (32)
2.3.2 Measurement and Calibration
We use the data described in Section 2.2.1 to calibrate the parameters of our model and measure
firms’ marginal revenue products and revenue productivities. Industries in the model correspond
to the four-digit industries within the manufacturing sector according to the ISIC Rev. 3 industry
classification. We measure firms’ value added, PsiYsi, as the difference between gross revenue and
intermediate inputs. We use four-digit industry deflators for gross revenue and intermediate inputs,
provided by the data set, to deflate our estimate of firms’value added. Industry value added, PsYs, is
measured as the sum of all firms’ value added within industry s. The capital input,Ksi, is measured
as the book value of fixed assets, which we deflate using the gross revenue deflators. To control
for differences in human capital, hour requirements, and rent sharing across plants, we follow Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) and use the wage bill deflated by the intermediate input industry deflator as the
measure for labor, Lsi. In a robustness check, we also consider hours worked for our measure of
labor.21
As described above, we calculate effective tax rates as the ratio between a firm’s profit taxes
and its gross accounting profits. We denote the measured firm-specific effective tax rate as tˆsi. Two
things should be noted. First, we use average effective tax rates as marginal effective tax rates. The
main advantage of following this method is that all exemptions and deductions of the tax code are
embedded in our measure. Hence, we do not have to model the intricate details of the tax code.
The main drawback of our approach is that the observed tax rate is potentially endogenous to certain
firms’ characteristics and past behavior. We conduct several robustness checks to verify that our
results are not driven by other specific characteristics and behavior of the firm.
We set the rental rate of capital to r = 0.05 and the depreciation rate to δ = 0.05, to make our
21Due to data availability, we only carry out this analysis for the period 2001-2007.
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results comparable with other papers in the literature. The elasticity of substitution between varieties
is fixed at σ = 3, so that firms’ price is 50 percent higher than their marginal cost. In Section 2.5.1,
we evaluate the sensitivity of our results with respect to these assumptions. The capital share αs in
industry s is equal to 1 minus the labor share in that corresponding industry for the United States.22
These shares are obtained from the NBER Productivity Database.23
Using the data and parameter values described above, we back out the capital and output wedges
in the following manner. For firms with positive accounting profits, we use equations (22) and (23)
to obtain the firm-specific wedges. Since µtsi = 0, the output and capital wedges are
(1 + τKsi) =
αs
(1− αs)
wLsi
(r + δ)Ksi
(
1− tˆsi
)
+
(δ + λr)
(
tˆsi
)
(r + δ) , (33)
(1− τY si) = σ
σ − 1
wLsi
(1− αs)PsiYsi
(
1− tˆsi
)
+ tˆsi. (34)
On the other hand, for firms with negative accounting profits the capital and output wedges are
obtained from equations (24) and (25). In this case, µ0si = 0 and the wedges are24
(1 + τKsi) =
αs
(1− αs)
wLsi
(r + δ)Ksi
, (35)
(1− τY si) = σ
σ − 1
wLsi
(1− αs)PsiYsi . (36)
Last, we use equations (20) and (26) to calculate firms’ physical productivity, Asi, and revenue
productivity, TFPRsi, respectively. Using equations (27)-(32), we construct industry and aggregate
measures of output, productivity, capital, and labor.
22Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we set the capital shares for each industry equal to those of the United Sstates as
we suppose that the US economy is less distorted than Chile’s economy.
23Most data on firm labor payments do not include labor benefits such as social security contributions. In the same manner
as Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we scale each industry’s labor share by 3/2.
24We cannot identify the capital and output wedges for firms that have accounting profits equal to 0, as we do not observe
µ0si in the data. We assume these firms face a tax rate of 0 and use equations (35) and (36) to back out the wedges. Although
these wedges are mismeasured, this assumption only ameliorates the impact of corporate tax rates on resource allocation, as
it gives more explanatory power to the output and capital wedges. Hence, our measure of the impact of effective tax rates on
allocative efficiency is conservative. Firms with gross accounting profits equal to 0 only represent between 2 and 8 percent
of the sample for the period analyzed.
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2.4 Misallocation and Corporate Taxes
In this section, we use the framework developed above to analyze the impact of effective tax rates on
allocative efficiency. First, we define the output gap as the change in output between two economies
characterized by different wedges and tax policy, but holding the distribution of firm productivities
constant. Then, we consider counterfactual tax policies and measure the implied output gap relative
to the observed distribution of tax rates. We decompose this measure to analyze the effect on alloca-
tive efficiency of the observed effective tax rates. Finally, we analyze what happens with government
revenue in our different counterfactuals.
2.4.1 Output Gap Decomposition
To study the impact of different tax policies, it is convenient to define the output gap between two
economies that only differ in the wedges and effective tax rates each firm faces. We decompose this
gap into five objects: the TFP gap, intersectoral capital reallocation, intersectoral labor reallocation,
change in aggregate capital, and change in aggregate labor. The TFP gap reflects intrasectoral real-
location, as can be seen from equations (26) and (31). Capital and labor intersectoral reallocation
are also affected by tax rates and wedges since the industry shares of capital and labor, ωK and ωL,
are a function of firms’ marginal products. Finally, aggregate capital demand changes for different
tax rates and wedges through the marginal cost of capital. Note that by assumption, the aggregate
demand on labor will not change since we have assumed a fixed aggregate labor supply.
Consider two economies that have different firm-specific output and capital wedges and profit
tax rates but are equal in all other aspects. Denote the levels of output of these two economies by
Y and Y˜ . We refer to the output gap as the log percentage difference between these two levels of
output. Using equations (27), (28), and (32), the output gap can be decomposed as follows:
log
(
Y
Y˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Output Gap
=
S∑
s=1
θslog
(
TFPs
˜TFPs
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
TFP Gap
+
S∑
s=1
αsθslog
(
ωKs
ω˜Ks
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intersectoral Capital Reallocation
+
S∑
s=1
(1− αs) θslog
(
ωLs
ω˜Ls
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intersectoral Labor Reallocation
+
S∑
s=1
αsθslog
(
K
K˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Aggregate Capital
+
S∑
s=1
(1− αs) θslog
(
L
L˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Aggregate Labor
. (37)
Below, we analyze different counterfactual tax rates policies and compare them to the distribution
of tax rates observed in the data.
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2.4.2 Output Gap Decomposition and Corporate Taxes
In this section, we quantify the output gap decomposition using equation (37). We consider two
economies that differ only in the tax policy implemented. Both economies are subject to the same
firm-specific output and capital wedges. By doing this, we ensure that firms face the same frictions
and model misspecification implied by the data in both economies. In one economy, we set taxes
to tsi = 0, and in the other economy, we set taxes to the observed firm-specific profit tax rates,
tsi = tˆsi. This measures the change in output implied by modifying the actual Chilean tax policy to
one with no corporate taxation, allowing us to quantify the effect of the dispersion and level of the
observed tax rates on TFP.
Table 12 presents the results from the output gap decomposition. Moving to a counterfactual
scenario with no corporate tax rates generates an increase in output that ranges from 20 percent to
38 percent, depending on the year considered. In all of the years analyzed, TFP increases due to
the policy change. This increase ranges from 4 percent to 11 percent and is due to a more efficient
intrasectoral allocation of resources. The effect on intersectoral reallocation is small. Intersectoral
allocation of capital accounts for between -3 percent and 2 percent of the change in output. In three
years, the effect of intersectoral allocation of capital is negative. Intersectoral allocation of labor
increases in all years but only between 0 percent and 2 percent. Most of the change in the output
gap is generated by large increases in the demand for aggregate capital. This is an implication of the
small open economy assumption of the model. Setting tsi = 0 directly changes the cost of capital,
which in this case generates large inflows of capital into the economy.
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Table 12: Output gap decomposition: tsi = 0 (%)
Year Output Gap TFP Gap
Intersectoral
K
Intersectoral L
∆Aggregate
Capital
1998 20.00 5.47 1.32 1.38 11.82
1999 21.20 6.43 0.41 1.05 13.31
2000 28.46 8.22 1.60 0.95 17.69
2001 22.79 5.64 0.10 0.72 16.33
2002 19.60 4.52 0.61 0.34 14.14
2003 19.85 4.82 0.03 0.55 14.45
2004 22.30 4.16 -0.41 0.80 17.75
2005 31.20 4.33 -2.94 1.74 28.07
2006 35.29 6.83 0.06 1.53 26.86
2007 38.02 11.12 -0.55 1.31 26.14
2.4.3 Allocative Efficiency and Corporate Tax Rates
In this section, we analyze how different levels of tax rates affect our economy by considering differ-
ent counterfactual flat tax rate policies. The equations implied by the model portray the mechanisms
through which intrasectoral reallocation of resources occurs due to different tax policies. Profit tax
rates affect firms’marginal products, as can be seen from equations (22)-(25). Since profit tax rates
interact with firm-level wedges, flat tax rate policies will have heterogeneous effects.
Our counterfactual exercise is the following. We set the corporate tax rate equal to t¯ for all firms
(i.e., tsi = t¯ ∀i). In these counterfactual scenarios, all firms face the same output and capital wedges
implied by the data as well as a flat tax rate t¯. We compare these counterfactual economies to the
observed Chilean economy and measure changes in allocative efficiency with respect to the data.
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Figure 5: Relationship between TFP Gap and t¯ (2003)
The schedule in Figure 5 portrays the TFP gap between a counterfactual scenario with tsi = t¯
and the observed Chilean economy tsi = tˆsi, for different levels of t¯, in the year 2003. This graph
shows that the TFP gap decreases monotonically with the level of the tax rate, t¯. This is the case for
all the years studied in our sample. Furthermore, for lower levels of t¯, the TFP gap is positive (TFP
gains), while for higher levels of t¯, this TFP gap becomes negative (TFP loss). In 2003, a flat tax rate
policy of t¯ = 0.0976 would have generated the same aggregate TFP level as the one implied by the
observed firm-specific corporate tax rates. This flat tax rate is lower than 16.5 percent, which was
the statutory tax rate for that year. If in 2003 Chile had applied a flat tax rate policy at the statutory
tax rate level without any exemptions and distortions, the loss in TFPwould have been 2.46 percent.
This remark is consistent for all the years in our sample.
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Figure 6: Change in Dispersion Measures Relative to t¯ (2003)
Notes: The change in dispersion for revenue productivity is measured as the log difference between the standard deviation of revenue productivity implied by the flat tax rate policy and the standard
deviation of revenue productivity implied by the observed tax rates. The same statistic is calculated for marginal revenue products.
The monotonically decreasing relationship between the level of flat tax rates and the TFP gap
can be explained as follows. For very small levels of flat tax rates, the dispersion in firms’marginal
products and, hence, revenue productivity is lower. This has clear implications for aggregate TFP,
as less dispersion in revenue productivity results in higher TFP. We can observe this mechanism in
Figure 6, which shows the dispersion in marginal products and revenue productivity for counterfac-
tual policy scenarios tsi = t¯ relative to the dispersion in these measures in the data. As the level
of the tax rate increases, the relative dispersion increases for both marginal products and revenue
productivity. Intuitively, as the level increases, the profit tax rate amplifies the effects of the dis-
tortions and misspecification embedded in the output and capital wedges. As a result, dispersion in
marginal products and revenue productivity increases, generating a lower TFP gap. This is the result
of resources being allocated toward less productive firms within a sector.25
To corroborate our results, we perform an alternative measure of allocative efficiency similar to
25As a robustness check, we measure misallocation as in Olley and Pakes (1996) using our model outcomes. We find that
the correlation of firm productivity with respect to both capital and labor shares within a sector drops as the tax levels increase.
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Olley and Pakes (1996). Our results are summarized in Figure 7. In Panel (a), the schedule labeled
“Counterfactual Policy” plots the correlation between firm productivity, Asi, and the share of firm
i’s capital stock,Ksi, in sector s’s capital stock,Ks, for different flat tax rate levels t¯. Panel (b) plots
the correlation between firm productivity,Asi, and the share of firm i’s labor, Lsi, in sector s’s labor,
Ls, for different flat tax rate levels t¯. The dotted line labeled “Data” corresponds to the correlation
measures for the observed Chilean data in 2003. The correlation of firm productivity with respect
to both capital and labor share drops as flat tax levels increase, which shows that the intrasectoral
reallocation mechanism described above drives the fall in the TFP gap. More resources are being
allocated toward less productive firms.
Figure 7: Correlation between Firm Productivity and Activity Share (2003)
(a) Capital (b) Labor
Notes: The solid blue line labeled “Counterfactual Policy” corresponds to the correlation between firm productivity and firm activity share for different levels of t¯. The dotted orange line labeled
“Data” corresponds to the correlation between firm productivity and firm activity share in the data.
Next, we analyze the effect of these tax policies on government revenue. In Figure 8, the blue
schedule labeled “Counterfactual Policy” portrays the Laffer curve for different flat tax rate policies.
A clear trade-off stands out. Although very low flat tax rates yield higher levels of TFP, government
revenue from corporate taxation is smaller. The dotted line labeled “Data” is the government revenue
collected from the observed corporate tax rates. The flat tax rate policy that yields the same revenue
is t¯ = 7.97 percent. If this policy had been implemented in Chile in 2003, then TFP would have
increased by 0.77 percent. This pattern, however, is not found for all years in our sample. For some
years in our sample, the revenue-neutral flat tax rate policy generates TFP gains with respect to the
data, while for others it generates TFP losses.
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Figure 8: Relationship between Government Revenue and t¯ (2003)
Notes: The solid blue line labeled “Counterfactual Policy” corresponds to the government revenue for different levels of t¯. The dotted orange line labeled “Data” corresponds to the government
revenue implied by the observed effective tax rates.
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we analyze the sensitivity of the results in Section 2.4 to our choice of parameter
values and our measure of labor input.
2.5.1 Sensitivity to Parameter Values
Table 13 shows the TFP gap from eliminating corporate taxes for different interest rates r, depre-
ciation rates δ, and values of σ, the parameter of the elasticity of substitution across varieties. For
different interest rates, results are identical to the benchmark. As seen in equation (21), when λ = 0,
the interest rate r does not affect the accounting profits of firms. Hence, it does not interact with the
corporate tax rate in the marginal revenue products, as shown in equations (22)-(25). For this reason,
different interest rates do not affect the TFP gap when corporate tax rates are eliminated. This is not
the case anymore when we consider different values of λ.
49
Table 13: TFP Gap for Different Parameter Values: tsi = 0 (%)
Year Benchmark r = 0.01 r = 0.1 δ = 0.01 δ = 0.1 σ = 5
1998 5.47 5.47 5.47 4.26 5.92 11.04
1999 6.43 6.43 6.43 0.93 7.90 11.43
2000 8.22 8.22 8.22 5.37 9.48 15.74
2001 5.64 5.64 5.64 0.86 7.49 9.98
2002 4.52 4.52 4.52 1.46 5.62 8.00
2003 4.82 4.82 4.82 1.92 6.10 6.66
2004 4.16 4.16 4.16 0.92 6.15 7.42
2005 4.33 4.33 4.33 -4.08 7.48 6.52
2006 6.83 6.83 6.83 2.32 8.52 10.08
2007 11.12 11.12 11.12 7.75 12.56 16.73
On the other hand, the depreciation rate has a direct impact on accounting profits, regardless of
the value of λ. Moreover, as the depreciation rate increases, the TFPgains from eliminating corporate
taxes are higher. Finally, we have chosen a conservative σ at the low end of the empirical estimates.
Under σ = 5, the TFP gains are higher from moving from the observed corporate tax rates to a
counterfactual scenario with no corporate taxation.
As in Section 2.4.3, we carry out the same flat tax rate policy counterfactuals. Our results are
robust when we consider different parameter values for r, δ, and σ. Figure 9 shows the same de-
creasing relationship between the TFP gap the level of the tax rate, t¯, as the one found in Figure
5.
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Figure 9: Relationship between TFP gap and t¯: Parameter Sensitivity (2003)
2.5.2 Hours Worked as Input for Labor
In the results described above, we measure Lsi as the firm’s wage bill. As a robustness check, we
recalculate our estimates using hours worked as labor input.26 Similar to Hsieh and Klenow (2009),
using the wage bill for the labor input allows us to control for between-firm heterogeneity in rent
sharing, skill level, and hours worked requirements. As these differences are not modeled in our
framework, when we use hours as labor input, they are loaded into the output and capital wedges.
As a result, dispersion in TFPRsi is higher.
26The data set analyzed has hours worked only for the years 2001-2007.
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Figure 10: Relationship between TFP Gap and t¯: Hours as Labor Input (2003)
Repeating our exercise with hours as labor input yields two main findings. First, in line with the
results in Section 2.4.3, the TFP gap falls when we increase the level of the corporate tax rate, as seen
in Figure 10. Second, the TFP gap across different counterfactual policies is larger. This is because
our results are amplified since the corporate tax rate interacts with output and capital wedges, which
are more dispersed for the reasons mentioned at the beginning of this section. This result holds across
all years of our sample, as seen in the output gap decomposition in Table 24 in the appendix.
2.6 Robustness Checks on the Measurement of Effective Tax Rates
Given that we use average tax rates in our analysis, there is concern about the endogeneity of firms’
characteristics and choices with our measure of the observed profit tax rate. To address this concern,
we conduct several robustness checks. First, we address the issue of loss carryforward by firms,
which could explain our results since we are considering a static model. Second, we analyze what
would happen if all capital was financed with debt, which would change the financing structure of the
firm and lower accounting profits, since interest can be subtracted. Third, we repeat our analysis with
the permanent sample of firms. By doing this, we discard the possibility that special tax incentives
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of young or old firms may be driving our results. As shown below, we find that our results do not
vary when taking these issues into account.
2.6.1 Financing Capital with Debt
So far, we have assumed that capital is financed entirely with equity, λ = 0. This is a strong assump-
tion since firms may finance capital with a mix of capital and debt. Firms have incentives to finance
capital with debt since interest payments are discounted from accounting profits and therefore lower
the tax that firms must pay. In this section, we analyze the other extreme case in which all capital
is financed with debt λ = 1 to determine whether our results are sensitive to this assumption. Note
that our calculation of the effective tax rate that firms face is not affected by the capital structure de-
cision of the firm since we observe profits net of interest and taxes. Hence, the tax rate we calculate
already takes into account the firm’s capital structure. However, our results will vary depending on
the amount of capital a firm finances with debt, since λ interacts with the effective tax rate tsi in the
marginal revenue product of capital.
Note that if we observed profits before subtracting interest and taxes instead of using profits net
of interest and taxes, differences in access to credit and other distortions that may affect the capital
structure would also be loaded into the effective tax rate instead of the capital and output wedges.
Also, it is important to note that the fraction of capital financed with debt can potentially be firm
specific. For example, some firms may have better access to credit than others. Uras (2014) explores
this mechanism and finds that it has important implications for capital misallocation. In our setup,
these differences in access to credit are reflected in the capital and output wedges.
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Table 14: Output gap decomposition: λ = 1, tsi = 0 (%)
Year Output Gap TFP Gap
Intersectoral
K
Intersectoral L
∆Aggregate
Capital
1998 16.58 5.92 1.72 1.34 7.60
1999 17.51 7.90 1.31 1.00 7.30
2000 24.10 9.48 1.91 0.97 11.74
2001 18.75 7.49 0.85 0.71 9.70
2002 15.90 5.62 1.43 0.34 8.51
2003 16.79 6.10 1.13 0.52 9.03
2004 19.09 6.15 0.78 0.79 11.38
2005 26.57 7.48 0.16 1.68 17.26
2006 31.18 8.52 0.64 1.52 20.50
2007 34.54 12.56 0.58 1.29 20.11
Table 14 shows the output gap decomposition under λ = 1 and under the scenario in which
corporate tax rates are equal to tsi = 0. Results are very similar to those of Table 12. The increase in
output from eliminating the effect of dispersion and level of corporate taxes is mainly explained by
an increase in aggregate capital demand and an increase in TFP. Hence, we can see that intrasectoral
reallocation of resources plays a significant role in explaining the output gap, while intersectoral
reallocation of resources has a negligible effect on the output gap. This finding is consistent with the
results found in Section 2.4.2.
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Figure 11: Relationship between TFP Gap and t¯: λ = 1 (2003)
As in Section 2.4.3, we carry out different counterfactual flat tax rate policies and evaluate their
relationship to the TFP gap. In Figure 11 we can observe the same pattern as in Figure 5. As the flat
tax rate level increases, the TFP gap falls. Also under the assumption that λ = 1, the dispersion of
marginal products and revenue productivity increases as the flat tax rate levels increase. Higher flat
tax rates exacerbate the effect of output and capital wedges, generating the increase in dispersion.
Furthermore, as in Section 2.4.3, this increase in the dispersion of revenue productivity is a result
of resources reallocating from more productive firms to less productive firms as the flat tax rate
increases.
2.6.2 Accounting for Loss Carryforward
One of the exemptions that generate dispersion in effective corporate tax rates is the fact that plants
can carry forward losses from one period to the next to reduce their tax base. Firms optimally choose
capital and labor taking into account that this exemption allows them to reduce their tax burden.
However, we do not model this explicitly since our analysis is static, and thus this specific source of
distortion is loaded into the wedges. To measure how sensitive our results are to this omission, we
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consider the following exercise. We take the average across years for each plant’s relevant variables
and estimate the TFP gap for our policy counterfactuals. By doing this, any losses that could have
been carried forward will smooth out. Note that if all the dispersion in effective tax rates was due to
this channel, the tax rates that firms face in this exercise should be less dispersed and similar to the
statutory rate. This is not the case, however, as the effective tax rate calculated by averaging profit
and profit tax across years is distributed similarly to the effective tax rates calculated year by year.
We can see this by comparing Tables 10 and 15.
Table 15: Distribution of Effective Profit Tax Rates: Loss Carryforward (%)
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile Standard Deviation
1.34 12.82 16.45 20.33 11.00
Our results for this exercise are similar to our benchmark results. The decomposition of the
output gap when firms face tsi = 0 can be seen in Table 25 in the appendix. When firms do not
face corporate tax rates, TFP increases by 6.18 percent, which is within the range of values of our
benchmark analysis, as seen in Table 12. Hence, loss carryforward is not the main driver of the
distortions generated by heterogeneous tax rates. Similar to Section 2.4.2, intersectoral reallocation
of resources accounts for a very small portion of the output gap, while changes in aggregate capital
demand play a more significant role.
As in the benchmark, we also carry out flat tax rate counterfactual policies and measure their
effect on aggregate TFP. We find that the negative relationship between the TFP gap and the flat tax
rate level still persists, as seen in Figure 12. Hence, despite eliminating the dispersion in corporate
tax rates coming from loss carryforward, as the flat tax rate increases, resources are allocated from
more efficient firms to less efficient firms.
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Figure 12: Relationship between TFP Gap and t¯: Loss Carryforward (2003)
2.6.3 Permanent Sample
Dispersion in corporate tax rates can potentially be driven by tax exemptions given to young entrant
firms, which are usually directed at fostering industry competition. If this is the only source of tax
rate dispersion and entrant firms are relatively less productive than incumbent firms, then these tax
exemptions would be responsible for the positive TFP gap shown in Table 12. Intuitively, these tax
exemptions would be allocating more resources to less productive entrant firms and fewer resources
to more productive incumbent ones. Hence, if Chile moved to a tax policy with no corporate taxes,
then resources would reallocate to the more productive incumbent firms, generating the positive TFP
gap.
To control for this mechanism, we focus on the firms that were always in operation for the period
1998 to 2007 and then perform the output gap decomposition for the years 2003 to 2007. By doing
this, we make sure that the firms had been in operation at least five years.27 If the only source of tax
rate dispersion was exemptions to less productive entrant firms, then when we eliminate them from
27We also perform the analysis for the years 1998 to 2002, and the results are very similar.
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the sample, the TFP gap would be 0. This is not the case, however, as can be seen in Table 16, which
implies that there are other sources of corporate tax rate dispersion that generate a positive TFP gap.
In this exercise, we also control for the fact that less productive exiting firms are driving our results,
since the permanent sample comprises highly productive firms that have been operating for at least
10 years.
As shown in Table 26 in the appendix, there is significant dispersion in the effective corporate
tax rates faced by the firms in the permanent sample for all years. Hence, tax exemptions given to
young firms are not the main driver of this dispersion.
Table 16: Output Gap Decomposition: Permanent Sample, tsi = 0 (%)
Year Output Gap TFP Gap
Intersectoral
K
Intersectoral L
∆Aggregate
Capital
2003 19.23 2.63 -0.08 0.75 15.98
2004 22.40 4.32 0.16 1.29 16.99
2005 22.96 3.54 -0.09 1.36 18.13
2006 27.75 4.74 -0.91 2.18 21.72
2007 26.36 5.36 -0.20 1.68 19.51
By comparing Table 16 with Table 12, we can see that the results for intersectoral reallocation
of resources and changes in input demands are similar. Also, we can observe that the TFP gap from
eliminating corporate taxes is smaller in the permanent sample in comparison to the whole sample.
The main reason for this finding is that the permanent sample controls for firm entry and exit. Firms
in this sample had been in operation for at least 10 years in 2007. Hence, they were relatively more
productive than the firms that entered or exited the sample during the time period we analyze. We
document this finding in Figure 13, in which we compare the distribution of log (Asi) for the whole
sample in comparison to the permanent sample for 2003.
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Figure 13: Distribution of log (Asi) for the Whole and Permanent Samples
We find that the mean of log (Asi) is higher in the permanent sample in comparison to the whole
sample. Moreover, the distribution of the permanent sample has a much thinner left tail and is more
concentrated around the mean. This pattern occurs in all the years between 1998 and 2007. This
is evidence that the firms that exit every year tend to be the least productive firms, while the more
productive firms remain. As a result, the gains from reallocation of resources in the permanent sample
are smaller than in the whole sample.28 Last, it is important to note that for the permanent sample,
the TFP gap is also decreasing in the level of flat tax rates, as seen in Figure 29 in the appendix.
2.7 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter is to quantify the effects of corporate tax rates on aggregate TFP through
allocative efficiency. To do this, we set up a standard monopolistic competition model that includes
firm-specific corporate tax rates as well as output and capital wedges. In our framework, firms can
choose whether to face a positive tax rate and have non-negative accounting profits or face a tax
28This finding is consistent with what Gopinath et al. (2017) find when analyzing Spanish firm-level data.
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rate of 0 percent and have non-positive accounting profits. We incorporate this exemption from the
Chilean tax code to address the caveat that firms’ behavior can affect the effective tax rate they face.
We calibrate the model and find that if Chile had eliminated corporate tax rates, then TFP would
have increased between 4 percent and 11 percent for the period 1998-2007. We also analyze how
different levels of flat corporate tax rates affect TFP in an economy characterized by other distortions.
We show that there is a monotonically decreasing relationship between the TFP gap and the level
of the flat tax rate. We carry out a sensitivity analysis on parameters and robustness checks on our
measure of effective tax rates and find that our results do not vary.
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3 Demographics, Labor, and the Great Recession
3.1 Introduction
Recent literature has reached the consensus that after the Great Recession, output and labor in the
United States diverted from their pre-crisis long term trends. Although many theories are trying to
explain the sources of these patterns, one plausible candidate is demographics. The start of the crisis
coincided with the “baby boomers” entering age cohorts associated with lower levels of labor force
participation and retirement. Hence, this shift in the demographic composition has the potential of
explaining the observed economic activity during the recovery.
The objective of this chapter is to quantify the effects demographic changes had on the evolution
of output and labor in the recovery period after the Great Recession. For this, we first carry out
an in depth analysis of employment trends for the time period 1990 - 2015. We document that a
significant portion of the literature is incorrect when comparing the evolution of labor after the crisis
with its pre-crisis trend. More specifically, we construct a counterfactual trend in which we account
for demographic effects on the intensive margin, number of hours worked, and the extensive margin,
labor force participation. We find that our counter factual trend of employment, which accounts for
demographics, reduced the gap in between the pre-crisis employment trend and the data by 83.7%.
Given this evidence of the potential effects of demographics on labor supply, we develop a growth
model that incorporates demographics. More specifically, demographics affect the dynamics of the
model through the growth rate of population and through changes in the age distribution of the pop-
ulation across time. We calibrate this model to match moments of the US pre-crisis economy.
Using this model, we first analyze how much demographics would have accounted for changes
on output and labor in absence of the Great Recession. We document that 35% of the output gap
between the pre-crisis trend and the data is explained by demographics. The channel through which
demographics affect output is through a reduction in the hours worked by agents in the model. We
then expand our analysis to also include fluctuations in total factor productivity. We find that this
specification is able to reduce the gap in between output in the model and output in the data to 2.5%.
Furthermore the gap in between labor in the model and in the data reduces to 1.2%.
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3.2 Literature Review
This chapter is related to two main branches of the literature: the Great Recession and Demograph-
ics. Since 2008, many hypotheses have tried to understand the reasons behind the slow recovery
in aggregate output and employment for the United States. Hall (2015) quantifies the contribution
of different factors to explain their role in the slow recovery of aggregate variables. He documents
that through 2013, output was 13 percentage points below its 1990 - 2007 trend, where the main
contributors to this gap were the fall in business capital, productivity, and labor force participation.
From a more theoretical standpoint, the causes and mechanisms behind the Great Recession have
been broad. For example, Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2015) set up standard neoclassical
growth model with monopolistic competition and coordination failures to explain long recessions.
They find that a big transitory shock, like the one in 2007, can force the economy into a steady state
characterized by lower output and employment. On the other hand, Shimer (2012) sets up a search
model with real wage rigidities to explain jobless recoveries. He documents that the interaction of
rigid wages with search frictions are important for a persistent slow recovery in economic activ-
ity. Heathcote and Perri (2018), Mian and Sufi (2011), Mian and Sufi (2012), Mian et al. (2013)
and Midrigan and Philippon (2011) study mechanisms by which a fall in housing prices, housing
net worth, and tightening of credit standards caused declines in household debt, consumption and
employment. This chapter is similar to these in the sense that it tries to understand the reduction
in output and employment that occurred after the crisis of 2007. It differs from these as it tries to
quantify the role of demographics in explaining the fall in output and labor.
The discussion on demographics and its effects on growth and employment has been increasing
in the past few years in the literature. First, Hayashi and Prescott (2002), Chen et al. (2005), and
Chen et al. (2006), modify the standard growthmodel to account for dynamics in exogenous variables
such as the growth in population. Among the caveats of only considering population growth in the
standard neoclassical growth model is that demographics only affect the household by increasing its
size across time. In other words, population growth does not take into account possible effects of
changes in the population distribution across age groups as well as differences in agents’ decision
making at different age groups.
Using an empirical approach, Maestas et al. (2016) find that the effects of the population’s age
structure has an important impact on output per capita growth for the US. They document that a
10% increase in the population above 60 years causes a decrease in 5.5% in the growth rate of GDP
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per capita. Given these aspects, we consider a modification of the standard growth model, which
accounts for differences in the population composition of age groups across time.
Since the Great Recession, there has been a bigger discussion on the relationship in between
demographics and labor supply. In his quantitative approach, Hall (2015) estimates that of the 13
percentage point drop in output, 1.1 was explained by the effect of the aging of baby-boomers on
labor force participation. Maestas et al. (2016) find that of the 5.5% reduction in the output growth
rate caused by demographics, two-thirds is a result of slower growth in labor productivity of work-
ers across the age distribution, while the rest is a result of slower growth in the labor force. To our
knowledge, the closest work analyzing the effects of demographics on labor supply is by Cooley and
Henriksen (2018). They set up a life-cycle model to examine how demographic induced changes in
the intensive (hours worked) and extensive (employment) margins of labor supply affect the slow-
down in output growth. This chapter differs to the aforementioned, as we analyze the specific effects
that demographics have onmacroeconomic aggregates through the lens of a modified growthmodel.
3.3 Employment Trends
We use monthly micro data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) obtained from the Integrated
Public UseMicrodata Series, IPUMS. To understand the effects of demographics on labor supply and
output after the great recession, we start our analysis by documenting stable labor patterns before the
crisis, for the period 1990 - 2007. We focus on this time period for the following reasons. We exclude
the period before 1990 because women employment rate was raising as a consequence of the increase
of their participation in the labor force. Additionally, after 2007, the Great Recession had a negative
impact on labor.
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Figure 14: Employment Ratio by Cohorts
Source: Current Population Survey
We analyze employment and hours worked by age cohort in between 1900 and 2007. For each
cohort, we observe the number of workers, and the total amount of hours worked. As Figure 14
shows, there is a stable evolution of the employment ratio (Eat ), measured as the ratio of employment
to population. For example, the monthly employment ratio for workers with age 40 fluctuated in
between 78% and 83%; similar patterns are found across age cohorts. We estimate the average hours
worked by those employed in each cohort (hat ), as the ratio of total hours to the total number of
employed in each age group. Figure 15, shows that this statistic is also stable over time.
To statistically test for the stability in the employment ratio and hours worked, we fit a line
through the time series of these statistics (linear regression). We find that the slope of the linear
regression is statistically zero for most years between 25 and 50 years old. The slope is statistically
negative for younger cohorts, and positive for older cohorts. However, in both cases the slope is
relatively small29.
29The slope coefficient is statistically significant for ages 15 to 20 (negative) and above 55 (positive). On average the slope
for younger cohorts implies a 2.7% decrease of employment ratio over 10 years, and for older cohorts implies an increase of
3.4% over 10 years.
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Figure 15: Average Hours Worked by Cohort
Source: Current Population Survey
Using these statistics of the employment ratio and average hours worked, we construct a coun-
terfactual of the total hours worked in the absence of the Great Recession. The motivation for this
is to have an aggregate labor measure that allows us to compare the actual data to what would have
happened without the crisis. We calculate the counterfactual in the following manner. Given the sta-
bility of the employment ratio and average hours worked for every cohort, we calculate the average
of these measures across time as in equations (38) and (39):
E
a = 1
T
2007:4∑
t=1990:2
Eat , (38)
h
a = 1
T
2007:4∑
t=1990:2
hat . (39)
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Figure 16: Average Employment Ratio by Cohorts
Source: Authors’ calculation with data from CPS.
Figures 16 and 17 plot these statistics for every age group. The patterns portrayed in Figures 16
and 17 are similar. For young cohorts, the employment ratio is lower as most individuals in these
cohorts are most likely with schooling responsibilities. For the case of average hours worked, young
individuals also work a smaller number of hours, a result that is most likely due to their time being
allocated to schooling. For age cohorts above 60, we can see that there is a fall in both employment
ratio and average hours worked. As expected, older individuals begin to retire at around the age of
60, which causes the employment ratio to fall. More specifically, in between the ages of 60 and 65
, the average employment ratio falls in about 30 percentage points. Also, the average hours worked
falls for older individuals; in between the ages of 60 and 65, the average hours worked falls in more
than 5 hours. Hence, older cohorts would affect aggregate labor supply through the extensive margin,
by choosing to not supply labor, and the intensive margin, by choosing to work less hours.
Figure 17: Average Hours Worked by Cohorts
Source: Authors’ calculation with data from CPS.
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The product in between E¯a and h¯a yields the number of hours worked per person in age cohort.
Figure 18, shows this product. For older cohorts, there is a stronger decline in the number of hours
worker per person in contrast to the average hours worked, as a consequence of labor supply falling
through the extensive and intensive margins. Comparing the age cohort of 60 to that of 65, there is
a decrease in the number of hours worked per person of more than 12 hours (58% drop).
Figure 18: Number of Hours Worked per Person by Cohorts
Source: Authors’ calculation with data from CPS.
Focusing our analysis on the drop of labor supply of older cohorts is important, as it is a potential
explanation of the apparent slow recovery of hours after the Great Recession. The years of the crisis
coincide with the start of the baby boomer generation entering older cohorts and leaving the labor
force. As a result, demographics played an important role during the years of the Great Recession,
as they did in the 1980s and 1990s, when the baby boomers were at their most productive stage of
their lives.
Next, we construct the total hours worked for the time period analyzed above 1990 - 2007, as
well as the time period afterwards, 2008 - 2015. For each year t, we multiply the product in between
E¯a and h¯a, times the population in its corresponding cohort, (P at ). Then we sum across age cohorts:
Ht =
79∑
a=15
E
a ∗ ha ∗ P at .
This total hours worked after 2007 is our counterfactual measure of hours in absence of the Great
Recession. Assuming that the employment ratio and average hours worked had not changed, which
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is a reasonable assumption given the stability of Eat and h
a
t ,Ht is the level of hours we would have
expected in the economy given only demographic changes, through P at . Figure 19 plots three pieces
of data: the linear trend of employment without taking into account demographics30 (gray line),
our employment counterfactual, Ht (blue line), and the actual data (orange line). It is evident from
Figure 19 that the linear trend of total hours and the data move parallel to each other; in 2015 the gap
in between these was -5.8% of the actual hours. On the other hand, the data and our counterfactual
measure of employment are converging as the gap in between these is just -0.9% of the actual hours..
Figure 19: Total hours worked
Source: Authors’ calculation with data from CPS and Census
We are conscious that the Great Recession constituted an important crisis, generating a big devia-
tion of employment from its pre-crisis trend. However, it is also important to note that demographics
play an important role in explaining the reason why employment did not recover to its trend before
the crisis. The aging of the working age population implies a fall in the total hours worked, which
is captured by our counterfactual employment trend. Comparing the data to this counterfactual em-
ployment trend shows that demographics is important in explaining the “slow” recovery in labor.
30This is estimated as the fitted line for the data in between 1990 and 2007, and then using this fitted line to forecast the
years after 2008.
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Furthermore, it provides evidence that ignoring demographic changes from economic analysis can
be detrimental not only for labor supply but for economic activity as a whole.
3.4 Growth Model and Demographics
In this section, we describe a variation of the growth model, in which the representative household
is comprised of individuals with different ages. We will use this model to generate our quantitative
results, similar to the approach by Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and Chen et al. (2006). Below,
aggregate variables are defined by capitalized letters, while per-capita variables are lower-cased.
3.4.1 Households
We assume there is a representative household with Nt members at time t. Population grows at rate
γNt = NtNt−1 . For each t, there is a number of P
a
t members of age a, so that Nt =
∑S
a=s P
s
t , where
s and S are the youngest and oldest ages in the household, respectively. Also, the household owns
capital and rents it to firms. Further, the household solves the following problem:
max{{
cat ,h
a
t
}S
a=s
,Kt+1,Xt
}∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt
S∑
a=s
P at (log (cat ) + αa log (T − hat ))
s.t.
S∑
a=s
P at c
a
t +Xt ≤wt
S∑
a=s
P at h
a
t + rtKt − τt (rt − δ)Kt − pit for t = 0, 1, ...
Kt+1 =Xt + (1− δ)Kt for t = 0, 1, ...
given K0,
where aggregate consumption is Ct =
∑S
a=s P
a
t c
a
t and aggregate hours are Ht =
∑S
a=s P
a
t h
a
t , T
is the total time endowment per member, β is the discount factor, αa is the share of leisure in the
utility function for individuals with age a, wt is the wage rate, rt is the rental rate of capital, δ is the
depreciation rate, τt is the tax rate con capital income, pit is a lump-sum tax.
3.4.2 Firms
There is a representative firm, with the standardCobb-Douglass Production Function, Yt = AtKθtH1−θt ,
where Yt is aggregate output,At is total factor productivity,Kt is the capital stock rented by the firm,
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andHt is the labor input of the firm measured in aggregate hours. We define θ as the share of capital
in output. We assume that At grows at rate γAt =
(
At
At−1
) 1
1−θ
.
3.4.3 Government
The government taxes household’s income on capital and lump-sum tax pit, and uses these resources
to finance government spending Gt so that the government budget balances every period:
Gt = τt (rt − δ)Kt + pit.
3.4.4 Competitive Equilibrium
The resource constraint of the economy is given by:
Ct +Xt +Gt = Yt,
where Ct is aggregate consumption, Xt is aggregate investment and Gt is government purchases.
Given a government policy {Gt, pit, τt}∞t=0, a competitive equilibrium for this economy is an
allocation
{
{cat , hat }Sa=s , Xt, Kt, Yt
}∞
t=0
and a sequence of prices {wt, rt}∞t=0, such that:
1. given the government policy and prices, the allocation solves the household’s problem,
2. given the government policy and prices, the allocationmaximizes firm’s profits such that factor
prices equal their marginal products, wt = (1− θ)At
(
Kt
Ht
)θ
and rt = θAt
(
Kt
Ht
)θ−1
.
3. the government budget is satisfied,
4. and the market clearing condition holds:
S∑
a=s
P at c
a
t +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Gt = AtKθt
(
S∑
a=s
P at h
a
t
)
1−θ
.
3.4.5 Numerical Solution
We solve the model in a similar manner to Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and Chen et al. (2006). First,
we compute the steady state of the U.S. economy in the sufficient distant future, using the calibrated
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parameters and exogenous variables. The steady state is obtained from the equilibrium conditions
of the model. With this steady state, we apply a shooting algorithm toward this steady state from the
given initial conditions, corresponding to the first trimester of 1990. The solution to this algorithm
is an equilibrium transition path from the initial conditions to the final steady state.
The equilibrium conditions are characterized by the standard intratemporal condition, Euler equa-
tion, and resource constraint obtained from the household’s and firm’s optimality conditions:
αacat
T − hat
= (1− θ)At
(
Kt∑S
a=s P
a
t h
a
t
)θ
∀a, ∀t, (40)
cat+1
cat
= β
1 + (1− τt+1)
θAt+1( Kt+1∑S
a=s P
a
t+1h
a
t+1
)θ−1
− δ
 ∀a, ∀t, (41)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +AtKθt
(
S∑
a=s
P at h
a
t
)
1−θ −
S∑
a=s
P at c
a
t −Gt ∀t. (42)
To obtain the steady state, first we detrend all variables so that xˆt = xt
A
1
1−θ
for per capita variables
and xˆt = Xt
A
1
1−θNt
for aggregate variables. Equations (40) through (42) become:
αacˆat
T − hat
=(1− θ)
(
kˆt∑S
a=s η
a
t h
a
t
)θ
∀a, ∀t, (43)
cˆat+1
cˆat
= β
γAt+1
1 + (1− τt+1)
θ( kˆt+1∑S
a=s η
a
t+1h
a
t+1
)θ−1
− δ
 ∀a, ∀t, (44)
γAt+1γNt+1kˆt+1 =kˆt
( kˆt+1∑S
a=s η
a
t+1h
a
t+1
)θ−1
(1− ψt) + (1− δ)
− S∑
a=s
ηat cˆ
a
t ∀t, (45)
where ψt is the ratio of government purchases to output,
Gt
Yt
, and ηat is the ratio of the population of
individuals of age a at time t to the total population at time t, P
a
t
Nt
.
In steady state, detrended variables do not grow and the ratio of individuals of any age a with
respect to total population remains constant. Hence the steady state equilibrium conditions are given
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by:
αacˆa
T − ha =(1− θ)
(
kˆ∑S
a=s η
aha
)θ
∀a, (46)
1 = β
γA
1 + (1− τ)
θ( kˆ∑S
a=s η
aha
)θ−1
− δ
 , (47)
γAγN kˆ =kˆ
( kˆ∑S
a=s η
aha
)θ−1
(1− ψ) + (1− δ)
− S∑
a=s
ηacˆa. (48)
3.5 Demographics and Macroeconomic Aggregates
3.5.1 Calibration
We calibrate the growth model described above to determine the effects of demographic changes on
economic activity in the United States. The time period we use for calibration corresponds to 1990
- 2007. The model has four parameters that are the same for all the household: θ (capital share in
production), δ (depreciation rate), β (discount factor), and T (total discretionary hours in a week).
Also, there is an age specific parameter (αa). For our analysis, we shut down the government, so
that its revenue and expenditure is equal to zero. The values for the four common parameters are
shown in Table 17. These are calculated in the standard way, as detailed in the Appendix.
Table 17: Calibration - Parameters for US Economy (1990 - 2007)
Parameters Value
θ 0.33
δ 0.058
β 0.948
T 100
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The disutility of labor, αa, is an age specific parameter that is chosen such that the average of
hours worked in the model is the same as the hours worked in the data, for each age. Using the
intratemporal condition of our model, (40), we obtain:
αicˆi
T − hi =
αj cˆj
T − hj ∀ a = i, j.
The Euler condition, (41), implies that consumption level is the same for all ages. As a result, the
above equation simplifies to:
αi = T − h
i
T − hj α
j ∀ a = i, j.
Using our data counterparts, h
a
, calculated in equation (39), we calibrate αa for all a. Figure 20
portrays the values of the disutility of labor by age. Our parameters vary between 2.45 and 3.56.
These are higher than what is documented in the literature. The reason for this is that we consider
hours per person by age as in Figure 18, and not the average hours worked (as in Figure 17).
Figure 20: Disutility of Labor by Age: αa
As mentioned before, we are interested in quantifying the effects of demographics on output and
labor. We will carry out two experiments. The first only considers the effect of demographics on our
model economy and sets up a counterfactual of how macroeconomic aggregates would have evolved
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in absence of the Great Recession. Demographics affect economic activity through the population
growth rate, γNt, and through the ratio of the population of individuals of age a at time t to the
total population at time, ηat . Both γNt and η
a
t are measured using data from the census. Using the
solution method described in Section 3.4.5, we use these time series and a constant TFP growth
rate γ¯A = 1T
∑2007
t=1990 γAt to obtain the equilibrium path for macroeconomic aggregates
31. We
compare the evolution of the aggregates in our model to those of the data to quantify the importance
of demographics in explaining trends in economic activity. Our second experiment builds on the
first one by considering demographic effects (γNt and ηat ) along with time-varying TFP growth
rates, γAt32.
3.5.2 Results
The period 1990 - 2015 is a time frame which constitutes a transition from a fast growing population
composed of middle-aged individuals to a slow growing population with older individuals. Incorpo-
rating this feature into our model, we analyze the transitional dynamics of several macroeconomic
aggregates for the pre-crisis period (1990 - 2007) and the years after the crisis (2008 - 2015). As
mentioned in Section 3.5.1, at first we only consider these demographic effects, and exclude any
other exogenous time varying variables, such as TFP. This allows us to understand how the economy
would have behaved in absence of the Great Recession.
The first aggregate we evaluate is the capital to output ratio. There are two effects at work in the
demographic transition of this economy. First, the decrease in the population growth rate generates
an increase in the consumption per capita over time. Second, the aging of population reduces the
amount of labor offered to the market, while keeping constant the number of people consuming. This
second effect reduces the consumption per capita over time. These two effects offset each other, as
can be inferred from (44). As a consequence of this, our model predicts an almost time invariant
trend for the capital to output ratio as can be observed in Figure 21.
31For the first experiment’s final steady state, we set the population growth to 0.4%, which is consistent with the census’s
estimation of the growth rate for the period 2050 - 2060. Also, we set the growth rate of TFP in steady state equal to the
average growth rate between 1990 and 2007.
32For the second experiment’s final steady state, we set the population growth rate equal to 0.4% and the TFP growth rate
equal to the average TFP growth for the period 2008 - 2015.
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Figure 21: Capital/Output ratio with only Demographic Changes
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Figure 22 presents the evolution of output in the data since 1990 (green line). It is clear that after
the Great Recession, output deviated from its previous trend (red line) and did not converge back to
it33. Amodel which excludes the demographic changes we account for in our model would yield an
output trend similar to the linear trend of Figure 2234. By considering demographic changes, through
changes in the population growth rate and the population composition, our model is able explain at
least part of the deviation of GDP from its trend previous trend.
33The linear trend is calculated as the trend of the data from 1990 to 2007.
34We solve our model with constant population growth rate and time invariant population composition, and obtain a output
series similar to that of the linear trend.
75
Figure 22: GDP with only Demographic Changes
The model with only demographic changes is not able to account of all of the drop in GDP, as the
main contributor of the drop was the Great Recession, which is not modeled in our first experiment.
Our exclusion of the negative TFP shock generated by the Great Recession is necessary for us to
quantify the only effects of demographics in explaining the deviation of the data from its pre-crisis
linear trend. We document that demographics accounts for 35% of the gap in between the pre-crisis
linear trend and the data.
The channel throughwhich changes in the population growth rate and the population composition
affects output is by the reduction of labor supply. As the population ages, labor supply falls due to
reduction in the hours supplied by the older cohorts. Figure 23 is the model counter part of Figure
19. When we compare the model’s total hours to the counter factual employment trend of Figure 19,
we can see that the fall of the latter is more pronounced. In the model, demographics only affects
labor supply through the intensive margin, i.e. the number of hours supplied by each cohort. The
counterfactual employment trend also takes into account the effects of demographics on the extensive
margin. That is, older cohorts participate less in the labor force.
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Figure 23: Labor with only Demographic Changes
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Our second experiment builds on the previous one by incorporating TFP changes also into the
analysis. Hence, this model will also account for TFP movements for the time period 1990 - 2015,
where the most important was the negative TFP shock of the Great Recession. Figure 24 shows the
evolution of the capital to output ratio. We can see that the model does a much better job of captur-
ing the movements in the data. Comparing Figure 24 to Figure 21, we conclude that demographic
changes which only affect the economy through labor supply are not able to account for the dynam-
ics in the capital to output ratio. Also, the model predicts a higher level of capital-output due to the
decrease in the TFP growth rate35.
35The final steady state was calculated using the average TFP growth rate of the period 2008 - 2015, which is smaller to
the growth rate of the period 1990 - 2007.
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Figure 24: Capital-output ratio with Demographic and TFP Changes
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Figure 25 presents the evolution of GDPwhenwe account for both demographic andTPF changes
in our model. We can see that the model explains most of the drop in the GDP. Furthermore, by 2015
the gap between out model prediction and the data is only 2.5%. Thus the interaction of TFP and
demographic changes do fairly well in capturing the evolution of output for the US economy.
Figure 25: GDP with Demographic and TFP Changes
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Demographic and aggregate productivity changes generate a model employment counterpart that
has similar movements to total employment hours seen in the data. For example, by adding TFP
changes to the analysis, employment in the model falls in the year of the crisis, 2008. This feature
was not captured in the previous exercise by construction. By 2015, the gap in between the model
and data employment series was of about 1.2%. If our model was able to capture effects through the
extensive margin, we suspect that this gap would be even smaller.
Figure 26: Labor with Demographic and TFP Changes
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3.6 Conclusion
The effects of demographics may not be big or fast, but they have the potential of being important.
The Great Recession coincides with a unique demographic period. At the start of the crisis, the
generation of baby boomers started to enter retirement. Even though demographics is not what
caused the Great Recession, it has the potential of explaining certain patterns for the slow recovery
after the recession. For example, demographics play an important role in total hours worked andGDP
not returning to their pre-crisis trend levels. In this chapter, we quantify the effects demographics
had on explaining the evolution of output and labor.
We develop a modified version of the standard growth model. This model incorporates demo-
graphics into the neoclassical framework through population growth rates and changes in population
composition across time. We calibrate this model to test the implications of these demographic
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changes. First, we abolish the effects of the Great Recession on economic activity, so that we can
evaluate how demographics affected output and labor for the time period 1990 - 2015. We find that
the model explains 35% of the between output’s pre-crisis trend and the data. We find that labor also
drops but not substantially. This is a consequence of demographics only affecting labor through the
intensive margin, amount of hours worked. If we considered a framework in which agents decided
whether to participate in the labor force or not, the we expect that hours would drop further in the
model. When we account for TFP changes for the time period analyzed, we find that the model does
a better job of capturing movements in the data, for different macroeconomic aggregates.
It is important to note that our model only considers the effects of demographics on labor supply,
which limits the effects of demographics on other variables. For example, we are not considering po-
tential interesting effects of savings decisions by different cohorts that can be important. To evaluate
this, a life cycle framework would be more appropriate.
From the policy stand point, we have not assessed the interaction of changes in demographics
and government policy. Changes in the composition of the population has implications for tax policy
as well as for social security. To understand the impact of demographics on labor tax revenue it is
important to carry out an analysis in which demographics not only affects labor supply but also labor
productivity, as suggested by Kuznets (1960). For the case of social security, given that the current
US system is largely pay-as-you-go, a further analysis should be carried out in order to evaluate the
implications of an aging population for both government debt and the sustainability of the social
security.
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4 Conclusion
The objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the effects of government policies on macroeconomic
aggregates. Chapter 1 and chapter 2 study two specific government policies and how these policies
impact welfare, employment, aggregate productivity, and output though the resource allocation chan-
nel. Chapter 3 analyzes the role of demographics in the current US economy, setting the foundations
for policy analysis in the near future.
Chapter 1 studies the effect of occupational licensing on welfare, the allocation of labor, and
the wage premium between licensed and unlicensed workers. Occupational licensing affects close
to 25 percent of workers in the United States. The social benefits and costs of licensing policy are
topics of much debate as licensing has implications for consumer welfare and labor market outcomes.
This policy is costly because it acts as a barrier to entry for workers into licensed occupations in the
labor market. However, it alleviates an information asymmetry in the market of goods and services.
The conventional view of the literature on occupational licensing is that the costs are larger relative
to the benefits. But, the assessment of the benefits of licensing has been limited. To tackle this, I
developed a framework with adverse selection in the product market and occupational choice in the
labor market. There are two productive sectors in the economy. In the licensed sector, the good that
is produced is heterogeneous in its quality, which is unobservable to consumers. In the unlicensed
sector, a homogeneous good is produced. The information asymmetry in the product market, carries
over to the labormarket, affecting the occupational choice of heterogeneousworkers between sectors.
Also, to enter the licensed sector a worker must obtain a license. To do so, the worker pays a fee and
undergoes training, which is costly in terms of effort and time. I estimate this model using worker
level micro-data and focus my analysis on low-skilled occupations. I find that removing licensing
training requirements leads to a 4 percent reduction in consumer welfare. The main forces that drive
this result are that although welfare improves as barriers to entry are lower, this is offset by lower
quality producers entering licensed occupations. Hence, when we evaluate the welfare implications
of licensing it is important to take into account the information asymmetry. In addition, when training
is removed, the wage premium falls by more than half.
Chapter 2 examines the effect of corporate income taxes on total factor productivity. Differences
in firms’ corporate income taxes distort differentially the cost of factors of production. This poten-
tially generates an inefficient allocation of resources across firms, which directly affects total factor
productivity. We use Chilean manufacturing plant census data to quantify the potential loss in TFP
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arising from the dispersion in effective corporate tax rates. These tax rates differ across firms due
to exemptions deductions and deferrals present in the tax code. We directly measure tax rates from
the census data and document a large dispersion in these rates even when we control for size, type
of entity and other characteristics. Next, we develop and calibrate a general equilibrium model with
monopolistic competition, where firms are heterogeneous in their productivity, tax rate, and capital
and output wedges, which account for all other distortions present in the economy. We find that TFP
increases between 4 and 11 percent when corporate taxes are eliminated. Next, we find that TFP
falls when we implement a tax policy in which we eliminate all deductions and deferrals, and hence
all firms face the Chilean statutory tax rate. The main intuition for this result is that although there
are gains in TFP from eliminating dispersion in the corporate tax rate, this is offset by the fact that
the level of the statutory rate increases the dispersion in marginal products, which generates a TFP
loss.
Since the Great Recession, output and labor diverted from their pre-crisis long term trends. In
chapter 3, we show that demographics is able to explain a significant portion of the gap between the
pre-crisis trend and the data, for both output and labor. An important reason why demographics play
an important role during the crisis’s recovery period is that the Great Recession coincides with the
“baby boomers” entering the age cohorts associated with lower levels of labor force participation.
Accounting for these demographic changes, we document that labor is converging to a different
employment trend. Furthermore, we modify the standard growth model and calibrate it to capture
the demographic features of the data for the period 1990 - 2015. Our results show that demographics
account for around 30% of the change in the trend of real variables after the Great Recession. The
analysis carried out in this chapter lays the groundwork for future research on the interaction of
demographics and government policy for the United States.
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Appendix
A Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Model
There exists a cut-off ability, a˜ ∈ [a, a¯], such that workers with a ≤ a˜ enter sector 1 and workers with
a > a˜ enter sector 2. Define p∗1 = p∗1 (µ (a) , σ (a) , c∗1, c∗2) as the equilibrium relative price. This
price is determined by the households’demands of good 1 and good 2 and the equilibrium conditions.
Earnings in sector 1 and 2 are given by:
y1 (a) =
(
θp∗1
r
) 1
1−θ (r
θ
− r
)
and
y2 (a) =
(
θa
r
) 1
1−θ (r
θ
− r
)
.
Define a˜ as the worker which is indifferent between sector 1 and sector 2:
(
θp∗1
r
) 1
1−θ (r
θ
− r
)
=
(
θa˜
r
) 1
1−θ (r
θ
− r
)
=⇒a˜ = p∗1.
Hence, for workers a ≤ a˜ = p∗1, d (a) = 1 since y1 (a) ≥ y2 (a). On the other hand, for a > a˜ = p∗1,
d (a) = 0 as y2 (a) > y1 (a).
A.2 Data
A.2.1 License Cost Components
Carpenter et al. (2012) carry out an in depth analysis of occupational licensing for the Institute for
Justice. Specifically, they create a database and use it to evaluate the licensing burdens and costs for
102 lower-income occupations across all states and the District of Columbia. These occupations earn
less than the national average and are at least licensed in one state. For each of these occupations they
gather information on the different measures of licensing burdens at the state level. In particular, they
gather information on licensing fees, amount of time spent on training prior to obtaining a license,
number of exams, and minimum age requirements.
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I use their burden measures of fees and amount of time spent training to back out the fee and
opportunity cost components of the license cost in equation (8). For each occupation, I construct
averages across states for the license fees and for the training time requirements. I match this data
on fees and amount of time spent training to all the licensed workers within my sample from the
SIPP data set. On average, the license fees paid by workers within my sample is $91. According to a
report by The Foundation for GovernmentAccountability, licensing boards typically require renewal
fees every one or two years. I construct the discounted value of total licensing fees within a worker’s
lifetime by making three assumptions. First, since my sample includes workers between the ages of
18 and 64 years, I assume that workers on average spend 40 years working. Second, I assume that
workers have to renew fees every two years and every time they renew they must pay $91. Third, I
use the calibrated value of r = 0.003 to discount future license fees; this value of r implies a discount
rate of δ = 0.996. As my model is static, the calibrated value of the fee component, F , corresponds
to the per period equivalent of the present discounted value of total fees across a worker’s career. To
calculate F , I use the following formula:
F = PDV of lifetime fees× (1− δ)(
1− δ(40×12))
Although the theoretical model is static, including the opportunity cost of training in terms of
resources is important as it also acts as a barrier to entry of workers into licensed occupations. Fur-
thermore, this cost also varies with a worker’s ability, which is the main distinction between the
opportunity cost and the license fee. I use the average amount of time spent training to calibrate T
in the opportunity cost component of the license cost. On average, licensed workers in low-skilled
occupations train 9.1 months before they enter a licensed occupation. I assume that workers only
train once within their working lifetime. Hence, T corresponds to the per period equivalent of the
training time requirement, which is calculated using:
T = 9.1 months× (1− δ)(
1− δ(40×12)) .
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A.3 Counterfactual Policy Analysis
A.3.1 Optimal Training
Figure 27: Distribution of Ability and Allocation of Workers - Benchmark vs. Optimal Training
(a) ΓB : Benchmark (b) ΓN : Optimal Training
Table 18: Change in Labor Allocation - Optimal Training (%)
Share of Workers j = 1 Average Ability in j = 1 Average Ability in j = 2
-34.3 22.7 -3.2
Table 19: Decomposition of Change in Wage Premium - Optimal Training (%)
∆Wage Premium ∆ Skill Component ∆ Information Rents
63.5 55.9 7.6
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A.3.2 No Fee
Figure 28: Distribution of Ability and Allocation of Workers - Benchmark vs. No Fee
(a) ΓB : Benchmark (b) ΓN : No Fee
Table 20: Change in Labor Allocation - No Fee (%)
Share of Workers j = 1 Average Ability in j = 1 Average Ability in j = 2
0.1 0.0 0.0
Table 21: Decomposition of Change in Wage Premium - No Fee (%)
∆Wage Premium ∆ Skill Component ∆ Information Rents
0.0 -0.1 0.1
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B Chapter 2 Appendix
B.1 Data
We use the manufacturing sector census data from Chile to construct our sample in the following
manner. First, we drop all observations with negative values for output, capital, wage bill, and profit
taxes. We believe these negative values are due to reporting error. Our model explains that aggregate
TFP is affected by the dispersion of marginal revenue products. For this reason, we trim the 1 percent
tails of the observations by the marginal revenue product of capital, MRPKsi, and the marginal
revenue product of labor,MRPLsi. Then we eliminate the 0.5 percent tails of the observations by
physical productivity, Asi. Last, when we consider counterfactual flat tax rate policies, there are
cases in which some plants have marginal revenue products with negative values, a result that is
mathematically possible but theoretically inconsistent. As a result, we eliminate observations with
negative marginal revenue products for a counterfactual flat tax rate of 20 percent, which is the
highest flat tax level we analyze. If a firm has positive marginal revenue products for this tax rate,
then it also does for a lower flat tax rate. On average, the number of firms that are eliminated because
of this criterion are only 1.7 percent of the total sample.
Table 22: Number of Plants and Shares in Total Plants by Size Class
Year Number of Plants 0 - 9 employees 10 - 49 employees 50 - 199 employees 200+ employees
1998 4,530 0.02 0.65 0.25 0.08
1999 4,052 0.06 0.64 0.23 0.07
2000 3,998 0.07 0.64 0.22 0.07
2001 4,214 0.11 0.60 0.21 0.08
2002 4,576 0.11 0.61 0.21 0.07
2003 4,509 0.10 0.60 0.22 0.08
2004 4,726 0.09 0.61 0.22 0.08
2005 4,461 0.11 0.56 0.24 0.09
2006 4,183 0.11 0.55 0.25 0.09
2007 3,919 0.10 0.54 0.25 0.11
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The total number of plants in our sample each year ranges between 3,919 and 4,726, as can be
seen in Table 22. Between 1998 and 2007, plants with 10 to 49 workers accounted for 60 percent
of the total number of establishments, on average. Plants with 0 to 9 workers, 50 to 199 workers,
and 200+ workers had an average participation share in the total number of firms of 9 percent, 23
percent, and 8 percent, respectively.
Table 23 presents the representativeness of our sample with respect to the manufacturing sector by
size category. For value added, the share of firms with more than 200 employees is 7 percentage
points higher in the manufacturing sector than in our sample. On the contrary, this share is 6
percentage points lower in the manufacturing sector relative to our sample for firms with 50 to 199
employees. The representativeness of our sample is better across the three different size categories
for employment and the wage bill.
Table 23: Shares of Total Manufacturing Economic Activity - By Size Category
Economic Activity:
10 - 49
employees
50 - 199
employees
200+
employees
Share of Value Added:
Sample 0.11 0.26 0.63
Manufacturing Sector 0.10 0.20 0.70
Share of Employment:
Sample 0.19 0.30 0.51
Manufacturing Sector 0.18 0.28 0.54
Share of Wage Bill:
Sample 0.14 0.29 0.57
Manufacturing Sector 0.12 0.26 0.62
Notes. This table only analyzes plants with more than 10 employees since those with less than 10 are underrepresented in the ENIA.
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B.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 24: Output gap decomposition: Hours as Labor Input, tsi = 0 (%)
Year Output Gap TFP Gap
Intersectoral
K
Intersectoral L
∆Aggregate
Capital
2001 67.93 14.94 -2.50 2.10 53.38
2002 60.80 14.36 -0.81 1.98 45.32
2003 66.75 14.74 -1.78 3.10 50.71
2004 80.08 23.41 -3.88 3.21 57.39
2005 101.54 31.07 -3.95 2.36 72.02
2006 123.91 33.70 -1.40 13.15 78.42
2007 118.84 32.19 -4.47 4.97 86.14
B.3 Robustness Checks on the Measurement of Effective Tax Rates
Table 25: Output gap decomposition: Loss Carryforward, tsi = 0 (%)
Output Gap TFP Gap Intersectoral
K
Intersectoral L ∆Aggregate
Capital
22.99 6.18 0.78 0.74 15.30
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Table 26: Distribution of Effective Profit Tax Rates: Permanent Sample (%)
Year 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Statutory Tax
Rate
Standard
Deviation
2003 2.75 14.46 17.16 24.11 16.5 12.53
2004 8.30 15.56 17.39 22.41 17 11.06
2005 8.43 15.83 17.44 22.36 17 11.52
2006 7.85 15.63 17.31 22.71 17 10.38
2007 8.16 15.87 17.65 24.40 17 13.05
Figure 29: Relationship between TFP Gap and t¯: Permanent Sample (2003)
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C Chapter 3 Appendix
C.1 Calibration
To calibrate the model, we use standard methods of Growth Accounting. Parameters δ and K0, the
depreciation rate and the initial capital are calculated together, so that two conditions are satisfied.
We use 1964 as the first data of capital, so any miscalculation of the initial capital is reduced by
depreciation over time. First, the initial capital output ratio of the data is equal to the average of the
capital output ratio for the first ten years,
K1964
Y1964
= 110
1974∑
1964
Kt
Yt
.
Second, the depreciation rate times the average of the capital-output ratio of the model is equal to
the average of the ratio of depreciation over GDP in the data.
1
44
2007∑
1964
δKt
Yt
= 144
depreciation
Yt
θ is calculated as the sample average over 1990 to 2007 of the compensation of capital. αa is
calculated for every age with the formula:
αa = T − h
a
T − hb α
b,
such that the hours decided by each cohort matches the sample average of the data. β is calculated
using the intertemporal equation 44. T is the total discretionary hours in a week.
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